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Introduction: Agricultural Policy in a Complex World

There seems to be general discontent with US agricultural policy. Fiscal
conservatives want to eliminate farm bill spending, which is in their eyes, the
epitome of wasteful big government.1 Environmentalists want to end a government
policy that shovels billions of dollars into subsidies, which supposedly encourage
farmers to plant fencerow to fencerow while ignoring the destructive ecological
footprint of modern agriculture.2
Fiscal conservatives who want to eliminate farm bill spending entirely are
applying free market theory without appreciation for the historical context of
modern farm support. Reducing farm bill spending has long been a goal for policy
makers, but the farm support system is fragile and its removal has proved
complicated. If nothing else, the relatively recent failed attempt to phase out farm
support payments in 1996 should serve a reminder that eliminating or phasing out
farm bill spending could devastate rural America and drag the whole of the nation’s
economy down with it.3 Though many policy makers would like to see farm bill
spending decrease, it is undoubtedly tricky to deflate any multibillion-dollar bubble
in the economy without destroying a lot of people’s livelihood. Yet some libertarians
and fiscal conservatives insist that US agricultural policy is an unjustified violation
of the free-market. From the onset of classical economic theory in the 19th century,
Adam Smith and David Ricardo, critics of their time, encourage us to respect the
freedom of markets so as to promote specialization and the subsequent economic
growth. From their historical context of the Mercantilist era, they were wise to
suggest the removal of state policies that were corrosive to the economy; tariffs and
other forms of what was virtually legal economic warfare amongst the rival nation
Dan Morgan, “The Farm Bill and Beyond,” Economic Policy Paper Series (2010), German Marshall
Fund of the United States, 15.
2 Craig Cox, Andrew Hug, Nils Bruzelius, Losing Ground, Environmental Working Group (Washington:
2011), 29.
3 Daryll Ray, 1996 Farm Bill: A Pattern for Future Legislation or Failed Experiment, Agricultural Policy
Analysis Center (2001) University of Tennessee.
1
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states of Europe.4 But just because the removal of mercantilist government
economic policies was preferable during the time of Smith and Ricardo, it does not
logically follow that governments ought to always keep out of economic affairs. A
faith in the invisible hand is equivalent to the Naturalistic Fallacy; just because there
are natural tendencies for things to happen (like Hurricane Katrina, for example, or
the boom and bust of speculative agriculture that led to the dust bowl), it doesn’t
not follow that these are good things. Smith advocated for free trade because it was
in the interests of the public and general welfare from his historical context. If some
government policy would change market conditions in the interest of the people
(many do), Smith, given his reasons for advocating for free trade, should then agree
that the state ought to intervene in the market for this instance. Free-market
economics does not mean zero government involvement; it means setting the
optimal conditions of free competition. Occasionally this has meant the breaking of
trusts and monopolies that were corrosive to free competition and public welfare.
Ultimately there’s no such thing, literally, as a totally free market, devoid of
government involvement – other than anarchy – because every society puts forth
the conditions under which markets operate. And so the ultimate question of
political economics is, what conditions ought we set for our markets? The question
is not should the government intervene in markets?, but in what ways should the
government do so. The goal of this essay is to determine the conditions the US
federal government should set for agricultural markets, and it takes for granted the
justification for having an economic agricultural policy of some kind.
Some environmentalists are appalled by the spending on subsidies and the
lack of conservation measures present in US agricultural policy. They would have
policy makers step up conservation compliance measures and finally beat back
agribusiness in the fight for conservation.5 I argue that these kinds of
environmentalists are unpragmatic in thinking that the best course of action is to
construct new public policies that will overcome the interests of farmers and

4
5

Laura LaHaye, "Mercantilism," The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.
Cox et al., Losing Ground, 29.
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agribusiness, the interest groups who effectively write the farm bill. But more
importantly, such environmentalists should pick and choose their battles. Farmers
and agribusinesses are indeed concerned with conservation and sustainability; after
all, the longevity of their industry depends on it. The problem is that market forces
push farmers, like any supplier in any market, into remaining financially
competitive. Short run market forces determine farming practices. Long run
ecological and economic costs, like soil erosion, are discounted over time, meaning
that only a fraction of the real ecological costs of farming practices is considered in
farmers’ present decision making. For this reason, US agricultural policy must
internalize the externalities of farming, so that price effective farming coincides with
sustainability. The most straightforward way to achieve this goal is to tax farmers
the additional social cost of their farming practices.
In order to argue with any good sense about agricultural policy one must
understand the history of agricultural policy and also the state of modern
agriculture. And the closer one looks at the present state of agriculture, the more the
global agricultural economy appears a complex and problematic system. The Earth
has 13.5 billion hectares of land and approximately 7.1 billion mouths to feed.
Despite the fact that we produce enough food to feed the world, 854 million people
suffer from malnourishment due to disproportionate distribution (and even if it
were distributed, simply in the sense of made available for purchase, those who are
malnourished would still lack the purchasing power for sufficient food).6 The global
population is still growing, so that we expect another 2 or 3 billion mouths to feed
by 2050, with the greatest growth rates in nations with lower incomes and
purchasing power and higher levels of soil degradation.7 This increased population
will mean increased demand for agricultural commodities, but beyond simple
population growth, the demand for agricultural commodities will greatly increase
due to rising incomes in developing nations, bringing families out of poverty into the

Pedro A Sanchez and M. S. Swaminathan, “Cutting World Hunger in Half” Science Vol. 309 (January
2005), 357.
7 Douglas L. Karlen and Charles W. Rice, “Soil Degradation: Will Human Kind Ever Learn?”
Sustainability Vol. 7 (2015), 12490.
6
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middle class and increasing demand for less resource-efficient foods like meat and
dairy. One OECD study predicts that 3 billion people will enter the ‘middle class’
over the next 20 years (as defined by a daily income of $10-$100 dollars/day), and if
we assumed that each of those 3 billion people consume one-tenth a pound of beef a
day, this would mean a 73% increase in beef consumption by 2050.8 It takes about
six to eight pounds of feed grains (often corn or soybeans) to produce one pound of
beef, and so as demand increases for meat (especially beef) demand for other
agricultural commodities will grow significantly. In the best-case scenario in which
we solve the problems of poverty and malnourishment, we still need to double food
production in order to feed everyone.9 Demand is growing, but due to land
degradation across the globe, the resources to supply demand are decreasing. As the
world’s largest producer and exporter of agricultural commodities, the United States
must be prepared for these incoming trends.
Between 1961 and 2000 global food production increased 146% while land
used for agriculture increased only 8%. However, this amazing rate of increased
production efficiency should not be expected to occur again. The improvements of
that time period were the result of the ‘Green Revolution’ in which farmers in
different areas of the developing world began, for the first time, applying fertilizers,
planting with selective genetic traits (e.g. Bt corn), nutrients, and irrigation. And
though the Green Revolution has greatly contributed to global agricultural
production and economic development in the productive areas concerned, soil
resources have been severely degraded in many instances from this agricultural
intensification.10 The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United
Nations reported in 2011 that 25% of all agricultural land on Earth is ‘highly
degraded’, meaning that it cannot be used reliably for food production.11

United Nation’s Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Global Sustainability (2012), Resilient
People, Resilient Planet: A Future Worth Choosing. New York: United Nations, 35.
9 Jonathan A. Foley, “Can We Feed the World and Sustain the Planet: A five-step global plan could
double food production by 2050 while greatly reducing environmental damage,” Scientific American
(November 2011), 62.
10 Karlen and Rice, “Soil Degradation,” 12495.
11 FAO. 2011, State of the World’s Land and Water Resources for Food and Agriculture. Summary
Report. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, 18.
8
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Urban-sprawl development poses another limit to increasing agricultural
production. In the US between 1987 and 2007, 41 million acres of farmland was
developed into urban areas. This is 41 million acres of some our best, most fertile
land that will not be used for agricultural production in the foreseeable future.12
One study estimates that the Ogallala Aquifer, which has been the source of
irrigation on the Southern Plains of the US since the 1940s after the dust bowl, will
be depleted in the next 80-100 years.13 A similar decline of water resources is
occurring in Northern China, where 4/5th of cropland is irrigated and ground water
levels are decreasing at a rate of 0.5 – 3 meters/year (along with increased nitrate
contamination in the remaining groundwater from excessive application of chemical
fertilizers).14 Despite being unsustainable at its current rate of use, irrigation plays a
huge role in productivity – 40 percent of the world’s food comes from the 18
percent of the world’s cropland that is irrigated.15
These issues are but a few of the blemishes in the relationship between our
agriculture and ecology. But none of these previously mentioned issues
singlehandedly represents this flawed relationship as well as soil erosion. Soil
erosion is a nearly inevitable result of practicing farming; whether the soil is tilled
or not, whether we use cover crops and strip cropping, whether we plant close to
watersheds or leave buffer-zones, farming leads to soil erosion by wind and water.
And the erosion of soil is no small matter for farmers. Soil erosion is known to
decrease yields and productivity.16 Many farmers implement these just
aforementioned conservation measures, but if the current trends of soil erosion
(and land degradation generally) remain, agriculture will suffer in the long run.
Nikos Alexandratos and Jelle Bruinsma, “World Agriculture Towards 2015/2030: The 2012
Revision”, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, ESA Working Paper No. 12-03
(2012), Accessed November 18, 2015, www.fao.org/economic/esa.
13 Leonard F. Konikow, “Groundwater depletion in the United States (1900−2008),” U.S. Geological
Survey, Scientific Investigations Report 2013−5079, p. 63
http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2013/5079 (Available only online.)
14 Matthew J Currell, et al, “Sustainability of Groundwater Usage in Northern China: Dependence on
Paleowaters and Effects on Water Quality, Quantity and Ecosystem Health,” Hydrological Processes
Vol. 26, 4050-4066.
15 Sandra Postel, “Safeguarding Freshwater Ecosystems,” State of the World 2006: A Worldwatch
Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, (2006), 41-60.
16 Rattan Lal and B.A. Stewart, Soil Degredation, (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1990).
12
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Some farmers and agribusinesses are more aware than others of this problematic
paradigm, and work hard towards achieving sustainable agriculture, but their
efforts are in conflict with short run market forces and the global ‘price-war’ of
agricultural commodities.
This essay seeks to explore policy solutions for reconciling private enterprise
with sustainable agriculture. In order to gain a practical grasp on the complex issue
of sustainable agriculture, this essay will focus on soil erosion. How can US
government policy reconcile the economic security of farmers and the longevity of
our soil resources? This essay answers that question by suggesting a traditional
economic approach for creating a new kind of US agricultural policy, one that uses a
soil erosion tax in order to reflect the long run costs of ecological damage into the
present acts of farming. This proposed soil erosion tax would establish short run
market forces that push farmers towards practicing agriculture in a more
permanent and sustainable way. Secondarily, the recommended policy would
continue to support farmers against downside risks so that the additional tax-cost
doesn’t put farmers out of business, but merely incentivizes conservation practices.
Finally, the new agricultural policy must consider any externalities of implementing
a soil erosion tax, such as decreased exports and perhaps the increased price of
food.
The goal of reconciling private agriculture and ecological conservation is
nothing new. And so in order to see why a break from the mold of previously failed
conservation policies is necessary, this essay utilizes a historical case study
approach. The first part of this essay is an examination of the American dust bowl
events. This historical model will be used to gain a better understanding of the
paradigm between private enterprise and agricultural sustainability. It is from the
historical lessons of the dust bowl that it becomes clear why we have a government
agricultural policy, and why a successful agricultural policy for the future must
incentivize conservation farming while respecting the autonomy and decision
making of individual farmers. Part B of this essay will then examine our current
predicament and the plausibility and ramifications of this essay’s suggested policy
solution: a soil erosion tax.
7

Part A
The Dust Bowl: An archetype of agriculture and ecological limits
The ‘dust bowl’ was a decade on the southern plains, in the 1930s, plagued by
drought, failed crops, soil erosion by wind, dust storms, and black blizzards.
Speculative growth in agriculture led to oversupply and an extreme supply glut in
the late 1920s and early 1930s. Suddenly, many farmers couldn’t afford to plant
crops on the land they had torn and plowed the native sod from. Millions of acres
were left bare and uncovered by vegetation when drought hit hard and lingered
through the decade of the 30s. The typical winds of the Great Plains turned into
highly atypical and terrifying dust storms. Although the entire American Great
Plains suffered drought and dust storms throughout the decade, the ‘dust bowl’
refers to the worst hit areas: north Texas, northeastern New Mexico, southeastern
Colorado, the western half of Kansas, the western Oklahoma panhandle, and parts of
southern Nebraska.17 George Borgstrom, an expert on world food problems, ranked
the dust bowl one of the three worst ecological mishaps in human history18; but
unlike the deforestation of the Chinese uplands (in approximately 3000 BC) and the
erosion of Mediterranean lands due to overgrazing livestock (occurring over
centuries since ancient times) the dust bowl took only 50 years of human settlement
to accomplish. 19

Timothy Egan. The Worst Hard Time: The Untold Story of Those Who Survived the Great American
Dust Bowl, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006) xi.
18 George Borgstrom, World Food Resources (New York: Intext Educational Publishers, 1973), 203.
19 Donald Worster, Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press,
1979), 4.
17
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A map of the Dust Bowl Region20

Examining the history of the dust bowl is useful in considering agricultural
policy today, because it illustrates the relationship between agriculture, ecological
limits, and economic policy. The account that follows is indirectly related to the
argument for a soil erosion tax in that it explains the origins of farm support system.
The history of the dust bowl is directly related to the argument for a soil erosion tax
in two ways: first, that the dust bowl was an emphatic example of the natural
market tendency for farmers to ignore ecological limits in favor of short run market
forces, and secondly, that a successful conservation policy that incentives more
ecologically friendly practices must do so in a pragmatic way that respects the
autonomy and private decision making of farmers. This second point is like the
idiom, you can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make it drink; policy makers
would do well to learn from failed conservation policies of the dust bowl era and
Image taken from PBS website and from the film Surviving the Dust Bowl:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/films/dustbowl/
20
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since, and apply an objective tax code that incentivizes conservation practices while
allowing farmers to freely make the decision to change on their own terms.

Section 1: Pre-Dust Bowl Forces
First, what caused the dust bowl? Identifying the causal chains of historical
events can be incredibly complex - there are many different contributing factors to
political ecological events. One might answer this question with drought, or
industrialized commercial farming practices, but these are each necessary and not
sufficient causes. Also not sufficient, but more fundamental causes of the dust bowl
are the social, political, and economic forces that pushed American agricultural
practices to behave in that given way. This section will illustrate some of these
underlying causes.
The answer to this question is deeply multifaceted; there are a combination
of ecological, economic, policy, and cultural forces that led to the ecological
imbalance of the 1930s dust bowl. And though it may seem impossible to identify
that which is common to all of the diverse causes of the dust bowl, Donald Worster’s
Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s does exactly that, by blaming the
cultural values of America - values best described as ‘capitalism’ - as the underlying
force of the various different events that created dust bowl.21 Paul Robbins writes in
his teaching textbook, Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction, a critical survey of
this growing field:
Donald Worster in a prominent example [of critical environmental history]
turned his attention to the American Dust Bowl, where drought and intensive
farming methods together contributed to soil loss, blowing dust clouds, and
the disruption of millions of rural lives, including bankruptcy and starvation
in the 1930s. His work concludes that the ravages of the landscape were a
nearly inescapable result of increased risk-taking farming behavior growing

21

Worster’s Dust Bowl has been the most useful and influential source for the Part A of this essay.
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from a capitalist agricultural economies established in the previous
decades.22
Worster provides an extensive analysis of the dust bowl crisis addressing why the
dust bowl occurred, what happened, and what policies were enacted in response
(and why such policies proved not fully effective). Most importantly, Worster’s
account of the genesis of US agricultural policy and soil conservation illustrates the
impracticality of localized community oversight and voluntary conservation
compliance, providing historical justification for a different approach to agricultural
conservation policy.
Worster describes the dust bowl as the failure of farming practices to
ecologically adapt to the southern plains.23 He argues that our cultural values are
the primary cause of this adaptive failure, specifically the set of American values he
calls the “capitalist ethos.” Worster claims that the way we use the land is dependent
on our cultural ecological values. He summarizes American ecological values, as
taught by the capitalist ethos, in three maxims: 1) “Nature must always be seen as
capital,” in other words, the land is seen only as an input of production, not as the
complex ecological balance that it really is; 2) “Man has a right, even an obligation to
use this capital for constant self-advancement,” by which Worster means that the
land must be used to maximize and produce greater wealth each year; and 3) “The
social order should permit and encourage this continual increase of personal
wealth,” in other words, that there be no community interference between a farmer
and their profit maximization.24 These cultural-ecological values in their summation
encouraged an unbounded optimism in the American plains settler. Though there
was surely an element of greed in the speculative growth agriculture before it’s
collapse in the 1930s, this was not a black and white problem where ambitious and
greed-driven farmers were entirely to blame for their own demise, as most plains
settlers were opportunity-seeking immigrants, desperately hoping for more than
the land could be safely asked to provide. Indeed, illusionary optimism is common to
Paul Robbins, Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction, Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004, 66.
Worster, Dust Bowl, 43.
24 Worster, Dust Bowl, 6.
22
23
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every epoch, as we tend to believe that we walk the path of progress. No one would
convince the plains settler that they could not farm the dry marginalized land of the
southern plains. Ultimately even the black blizzards of the 1930s would fail to
restrain this optimism.
The identification of American cultural values (the capitalist ethos) as the
common denominator amongst the various forces that created the dust bowl is a
good theory. The dust bowl crisis was the result of human behavior and our
behavior is reinforced by our enduring cultural values. Cultural values are heavily
influenced by the way we organize society for production and so unsurprisingly,
greater productivity is an eagerly embraced cultural value. In the decades leading up
to the dustbowl, due to both ignorance and hubris, our cultural values led to greatly
speculative and irresponsible agriculture. Millions of acres of native sod were
exchanged for the hottest cash crop, wheat, changing the land that had depended
upon prairie grass for millennia and the wind erosion that resulted was
catastrophic. Ecological limits in our relationship to the earth were ignored in
preference for immediate profits and increased productivity.
However, Worster’s theory does not provide a viable solution. Placing of
blame on cultural values implies that alternative values are possible. Instead of our
endless crusade for greater wealth and producing the maximum wealth from the
soil for our personal improvement, Worster believes our culture could reinforce
values that treat the soil and the whole environment as more than a commodity to
be squeezed of its value. The Plains Indians serves as his model for alternative
cultural-ecological values. In contrast to the American capitalist ethos, Worster
describes the spiritual conservation ethic of the Native Americans who had lived on
the plains in a relatively better state of human-ecological harmony. Unlike the
supposedly autonomous and nature dominating westerner, the Native Americans of
the plains understood that they were a part of the natural balance, dependent on the
grasslands. They did not have an American-style growth culture. They used nature
with complete (and spiritual) reverence, restraining their wants and numbers to
respect the limits of the land. While western values, rooted in Christianity, promote
excessive propagation, Plains Indians deliberately restricted their frequency of
12

births. Worster says that these earthly holistic values, of intimacy with the land and
scaling their ‘needs’ to a limited world and scarce resources are common amongst
old-world cultures that have stood the test of time.25 American plains settlers (along
with the whole nation) clearly lacked these traits, proudly self-identifying as
‘sodbusters’.26 However, beyond citing Native American values, as ecologically
superior, Worster is vague on the topic of alternatives to commercial farming and
provides no specifics on how to achieve this cultural revolution.
Worster’s lack of alternatives should not however diminish the weight of his
primary argument, that the cultural impetus that we might call capitalism is a
driving force for all of the underlying economic and political forces that developed
into the dust bowl of the 1930s. If we accept his thesis, then the next step is to look
at the specific ways those values were manifest. The various political and economic
forces are also highly relevant in understanding what caused the dust bowl. After all,
this essay seeks to draw lessons for agricultural policy solutions in the present, and
the revision of cultural values is not a practical policy solution.
The dust bowl comprised some of the most marginal land on the Great Plains,
least suited for agriculture. On an expedition into the newly acquired American
lands of the Louisiana Purchase, Zebulon Pike followed the Arkansas River up into
the Rocky Mountains and witnessed sprawling sand dunes in part of the Southern
Plains. What he saw was likely some riverbed blowing out during a dry season.
Pike’s report in 1806 suggested that the interior plains, soon dubbed the Great
American Desert, were an insurmountable restriction to Western expansion.
Though its aridity was indeed exaggerated, Pike saw the ecology on its own terms,
unlike the settlers that would follow.27
Before settlers came to the southern plains, they settled upon the more
fertile soils of the Great Plains. The Homestead Act of 1862, the legislative
embodiment of Jeffersonian Democracy, was a force for settlement on the plains for
decades, even after its ironic reversal in 1936 with the creation of the resettlement
Worster, Dust Bowl, 77.
Worster, Dust Bowl, 96.
27 Worster, Dust Bowl, 80-81.
25
26
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administration, which aimed to evacuate areas of homestead land.28 The original
Homestead Act allowed settlers 160 acres of property after 5 years of making
‘improvements’ on the land, by which the government meant cultivation.29
Homesteading was Jeffersonian because Thomas Jefferson idealized the small
farmer as the true American and envisioned an American democracy comprised of
more and more small farmers. But because the population would inevitably grow
and the opportunity for each person to farm would diminish if constrained to
limited land, the nation would need to continuously acquire more land. The spirit of
the Homestead Acts was an expression of growth culture; we will not have peace
and justice unless our economy (in Jefferson’s eyes, our land) is constantly
growing.30 Today, the legacy of the homestead acts is mixed. In many cases it indeed
contributed to opportunity and prosperity on the land for many hardworking farm
families and established farming operations in fertile areas. But as market forces
demanded more production from each farm unit, and the more fertile lands had
already been claimed so that homesteaders began farming less desirable land like
southern plains, the Homestead Acts became “almost an obligatory act of poverty.”31
Even the Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909, which increased the acreage allotment
from 160 to 320 acres32, proved adequate only for a few years until market forces (a
massive surge in settlement and increase in aggregate market production) pushed
the operating costs even higher than what 320 acres of crops could cover.33
Despite hardships, the optimism of the frontier was unquenchable. There
was an ideological backlash to those who spoke of a Great American Desert. Charles
Dana Wilber, a town builder in Nebraska provides an explicit example of faith in the
cultivation of the southern plains. Quoting the book of Genesis, Book 2, Chapters 5
and 6 in his journal, Wilber wrote “But there went up a mist from the Earth and
watered the whole face of the ground; for the Lord God had not sent rain upon the

Worster, Dust Bowl, 229
Worster, Dust Bowl, 82.
30 Worster, Dust Bowl, 80.
31 Egan, The Worst Hard Time, 268.
32 Worster, Dust Bowl, 87.
33 Worster, Dust Bowl, 92.
28
29
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earth, (because) and there was no man to till the ground.” Wilber interprets this
biblical passage as meaning that the earth began first in a state of desert, of dew
rising into mist under the heat of day then falling onto the earth again at night, until
man came and tilled the land and brought about vegetation:
Everywhere under these new conditions of husbandry, the clouds will gather
into larger clouds and overspread the heavens; and the impending shower
will fall upon the farm and garden, not by grace or fortuity, but by an external
law… In this miracle of progress, the plow was the avant courier – the
unerring prophet – the procuring cause. Not by any magic or enchantment,
not by the incantations or offerings, but, instead, in the sweat of his face,
toiling with his hands, man can persuade the heavens to yield their treasures
of dew and rain upon the land he has chosen for a dwelling place. It is indeed
a grand consent, or rather concert of the forces – the human energy or toil,
the vital seed, and the polished raindrop that never fails to fall in answer to
the imploring power of prayer of labor.34
Wilber argued that rain would follow the plow, and as absurd as it sounds, he wasn’t
alone. Scientists (or quacks) assured settlers that the steam from locomotion traffic
would increase precipitation.35 Never underestimate the desire to rationalize our
unfounded desires.
Twenty inches of rainfall had been the standard threshold for growing crops
without irrigation, but the southern plains and much of the western Great Plains
were below that threshold. In addition, it takes 22 inches of rain in the Oklahoma
panhandle to deposit the same amount of moisture into the soil as 15 inches or rain
in the upper-Mississippi River valley. The vegetation that had evolved under these
conditions was unlike that of any cash crop; mesquite, a native plant, sends its roots
down as far as 150 feet in order to find water. 36 Unsurprisingly, the feasibility of
small agricultural holds on the more arid areas of the plains was seriously

Henry Nash Smith, “The Rain Follows the Plow: The Notion of Increased Rainfall for the Great
Plains, 1844-1880”, Huntington Library Quarterly Vol. 10, No. 2 (Feb, 1947), 188-189.
35 Egan, The Worst Hard Time, 25.
36 Egan, The Worst Hard Time, 22-24.
34
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challenged not long after the 1862 homestead legislation. Drought and grasshopper
plagues ravaged the Great Plains in the early 1870s prompting a wave of
outmigration, mostly people leaving Kansas.37 In 1878, director of the US Geological
Survey, John Wesley Powell suggested sweeping revisions of the Homestead Act in
his Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States. Everywhere west of
the 100 Meridian (roughly down the middle of the Dakotas all the way down to
Texas) he reported that there was not enough rainfall for raising crops and that a
160-acre allotment was insufficient for a single family. Powell proposed that
instead, the government provide 2560 acreage ‘pasturage farms’ in order to raise
livestock. The proposal was denounced not only as elitist and un-Jeffersonian, but
also too pessimistic about the region itself. But when drought hit again in the 1890s,
and entire communities of farmers in the western Dakotas and eastern Montana
were abandoned, Powell’s suggestions gained some credibility. 38 During and after
the 1930s, Powell’s report was popularized again. Some New Dealers referenced
Powell in their belief that the key to successful agriculture in the region was
decreasing the number of, and allowing for, larger farming units.39 Certainly that’s
where the market forces were headed in the 1930s – the decade was a crisis of
overproduction, and in theory, the free market equilibrium would have been
‘naturally’ accomplished when the less efficient farming units went into bankruptcy,
and the total number of farming units decreased, along with aggregate production.
Given this fact of market equilibrium, politically aiding the removal of farming units
might have been wise. But Worster disagrees with Powell. In accredit to Powell’s
views, Worster says that at least he recognized ecological reality, rather than an
optimistic fantasy, and that he certainly wasn’t an elitist, but genuinely hoped to
make total westward expansion redeemable in the face of likely failure. But to
Powell’s discredit, Worster thinks he saw only the economic circumstances of his
day and assumed that one adjustment of farmers’ income would create a sustainable
plains settlement, when in fact a real solution would need to address the fact of
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economies of scale, the trend of farms becoming larger and for a fewer number of
farmers in the whole market. He failed to see the economic trajectory on which we
all travel.
Though settlement policy was not revised in the late 19th century, the
hardships on the semi-arid plains did trigger an agricultural adaption effort that
became known as dryland farming. It was the advent of new agronomic practices
that made farming regions like the southern plains relatively reliable (at least
during the fortunate years). The introduction of ‘drought resistant’ Turkey red, a
variety of Russian winter wheat, introduced to the plains by Germans from Russia,
provided a feasible cash crop for the land. Campbell’s Soil Culture Manual, by the
South Dakota homesteader Hardy Webster Campbell, became a governmentendorsed must-have for every plains settler, though its agronomic suggestions were
quite primitive. Campbell emphasized that small amounts of rainfall could be stored
in the ground by increasing the moisture retention of soil. He prescribed that the
ground be pulverized by disking, leaving a smooth surface. The subsoil should be
packed, strengthening the root-bed (and supposedly pulling up ground water
through capillary action!). To protect from evaporation, Campbell called for
cultivation after each rain to build up fine dust mulch (in the hindsight of the dust
bowl, clearly a poor idea). Later he adjusted his methods to advocate mulch made
from soil clods, known as aggregates, not dust.40
With the improved confidence of dryland farming agronomy, and the
Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909 (which was amended in 1912 so that the time
allotted for improvements to the land decreased from five to three years), a new
surge of settlement came like nothing before. In 1912, there were 24,000 new
homestead entries; in 1913, there were 53,000 entries. The rate of settlement
decreased, but stayed above 30,000 entries annually until the 1920s. And the size of
farm units grew from averaging 256 acres in 1890 to averaging 813 acres in 1930.
The increase in agricultural production was both spurred by and coincidentally
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matched increased demand, due to growing urban centers in America and growing
exports, especially during WWI. The price of wheat was favorable between 1909
and 1914 at around $1 per bushel, but in 1919, the price rose to $2.50. Just to
emphasize the magnitude of the increased demand due to foreign markets, this rise
in prices coincided with a 70 percent increase in wheat production from 1917 to
1919.41 Increased wheat planting, instead of other corps, and a bountiful harvest
year were largely responsible for this increase, but also, of the 13.5 million acres
increase in wheat acreage from 1909-1913 (years later used to calculate ‘parity’ the golden standard for supposedly fair farm unit purchasing power) 11 million
acres were on newly plowed land. 42 With such an increase in production, one would
expect prices to lower, not skyrocket to $2.50. Global demand for agricultural
commodities was incredibly high following the blockades and burnt crops of WWI.43
If 1910 – 1930 was the time in which the seeds of the dust bowl were
planted, one force behind the dust bowl must be industrial agricultural technology,
which came in the form of a tractor and was just then arriving on the scene. Fordism
was being applied to agriculture on the plains, not only in the implementation of
modern machinery, but also with the widespread application of commercial
monocropping (specializing in a single cash crop, in contrast to diversified, or even
subsistence farming). New technology dramatically increased labor efficiency; from
1910 – 1930 the labor involved in agriculture decreased by one-third while
production rose by one-third. In 1830 it had taken 58 hours to harvest one acre of
wheat, but in 1930, it took less than three hours on the most advanced farms. The
tractor, along with the disk plow and the harvester-thresher (named the combine
for its dual function) that were pulled behind it, completed the industrial
mechanization of an early 20th century farm. But these machines were an
investment, and often required mortgages. From 1910 to 1920, the average cost of
implements on an average Kansas farm went from $292 to $980; farming was
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becoming an increasingly capitalized industry. When prices depressed after the
recovery of European markets, smaller, less efficient farm units were squeezed out
of the US market, often because they defaulted on their machinery mortgages.44
Economies of scale are a reality; those who pioneer larger and more industrialized
farms set the pace, and those who can’t keep up must drop out.
In 1920, the price of wheat was approximately $2 a bushel. In 1928, many
were predicting $1.50, but after a neither perfect nor disastrous harvest, the price of
wheat came in around $1.00.45 In 1930, wheat went for 30 cents a bushel – there
was so much excess supply it was piling up outside the grain elevators. Despite a
small drought on the southern plains that year, bumper crops in the northern plains
brought in far more wheat than what was demanded for consumption. ‘Suitcase
farmers’ – farmers who were not permanent residents of their land - had been
eagerly tearing up sod in order to get their share in the wheat bonanza, but when
prices depressed, they were the first to abandon their land, leaving their fields
fallow and uncovered, letting the soil dry up and blow into dust.46 The price of
wheat was falling, along with other agricultural commodities because the supply
had increased while demand had decreased due to the beginning of the Great
Depression. Farmers’ revenue was simply insufficient to cover operating costs. But
for those who couldn’t leave the land so easily, there was seemingly only one option:
plant more. The fall of 1930 saw more ‘virgin’ soil plowed up than ever before.47
Farmers were digging deeper into their own grave, searching for a miracle, but
instead the 1930s only brought the rural economy into the grave with them.

Section 2: The Dust Bowl: The Event Itself
What was plains ecology like before American/Anglo settlement and
development? One of the biggest challenges to critical environmental history is
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simply the lack of historical data on the environment.48 Nonetheless, Worster
identifies several basic aspects of this ecology that seem certain. There existed an
array of biodiversity with the primary producer being one of the several prairie
grasses that sprawled over the land seemingly forever in every direction. Shortgrass parries where more common in the drier southern plains, and tall-grass in the
wetter north. Worster cites estimates that Buffalo grass on the southern plains once
supported 30 million bison.49 Though the grass would sometimes die during
droughts, it would remain rooted and still hold the soil in place.50 With western
settlement, ecological reality was traded for economic realism. Native sod has little
economic value and was torn up in favor of cultivated fields at incredible rates
through the early 20th century. In 1879, 10 million acres of the Great Plains were
plowed. Fifty years later in 1929, that number was 100 million acres.51 When the
extended drought of the 1930s hit, planted crops failed to grow and the earth was
left bare for plains wind to lift the precious soil into black blizzards, carrying it
sometimes all the way to the Atlantic. The dust bowl occurred specifically on the
southern plains (in north Texas, western Oklahoma, southeastern Colorado, western
Kansas, and southwestern Nebraska) because this semiarid land proved too volatile
an ecosystem to survive the destruction of its native sod. Agriculture had pushed the
land beyond its breaking point. In the words of Worster, “Here on the edges of the
fertile earth man needed to summon all of the cooperative, self-effacing, cautious
elements of his nature to live successfully; Americans however, found precisely
those qualities the hardest to nurture and express.”52 Following the immediate
demands of the market, farmers tended to disregard the ecological limits of their
environment. With the onset of the dust bowl, the ecologically destructive
inhabitants of the land were finally reaping what they had sown.
The extended drought of the 1930s came at an especially inopportune time.
The farm economy was already in shambles. In part, the expansionary growth of
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agriculture on the southern plains was spurred by years of generous precipitation;
from 1926-1930, Boise City, the seat of Cimarron County Oklahoma, averaged over
19 inches of annual rainfall. In 1932, drought hit and annual precipitation was only
12 inches that year. In 1934, there was less than 9 inches of annual rainfall and over
the five years between 1931 and 1936, the county averaged just less than 12 inches.
The effect of the drought on yields was devastating. In the 1920s, farmers in
Cimarron County averaged yields of 13.1 bushels/acre, but throughout the 1930s,
they averaged a meager 0.9 bushels/acre.53 Without the drought, the dust bowl
would never have come about.
The measured amount of soil lost on the Great Plains due to erosion in the
1930s is not exactly known, but the estimates are extreme. Before the dust bowl,
Americans had mostly ignored the possibility of soil limitations. In 1909, a report by
the Bureau of Soils stated, “The soil is the one indestructible, immutable asset that
the nation possesses. It is the one resource that cannot be exhausted; that cannot be
used up.”54 This is entirely false. Soil erosion by wind and water on cultivated land
has depleted soil resources over the past century by operating with erosion rates
greater than soil formation rates.55 In the 1930s, the US suffered the most extreme
and sustained wind erosion ever recorded, across the whole plains. Wind erosion
severity is strongly associated with the type of soil – sandy soil is eroded more
easily than clayey soil. The dust bowl occurred where it did mostly because the soil
was more easily susceptible to wind erosion.56 The intense dusters and black
blizzards of the dust bowl left their mark in ecological damage. In the single year of
1935, an estimated more than 850 million tons of topsoil had blown off the southern
plains. At the end of the year, there were 5 million acres deemed with “little chance
of ever being cultivated again,” and the USDA considered for the first time that
farmers were currently on 100 million acres that “might never be productive
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farmland.”57 In the worst hit areas, even the grasslands that had been preserved for
grazing were smothered by dust, some ten feet under.58 In Baca County Colorado
alone, more than 1.1 million acres were so eroded they were estimated to never
support crops again.59 By 1938, 10 million acres had lost at least five inches of
topsoil, and another 13.5 million acres had lost at least two and half inches.60
The social collapse of the dust bowl was nearly as violent as the ecological
one. Though the whole nation’s rural economy was in shambles during the early
1930s, it was farmers on the plains, especially the southern plains, who suffered
most. In his book, Worster uses Cimarron County as an archetype of a dust bowl
community. In Cimarron, the market value of wheat harvest was $700,000 in 1930,
$1.2 million in 1931, $7000 in 1932, and $0 in 1933 (out of 200,000 planted acres,
not a single bushel of wheat was harvested).61 In 1934, only one in four farming
operations remained debt free.62 Nearly a million people fled their farms in the
whole Great Plains from 1930 to 1935 and another 2.5 million left in the second half
of the decade.63 It wasn’t only farmers with crops who were hurting; ranchers also
faced immense overproduction and low prices. Within the dust bowl, cattle
frequently dropped dead of ‘dust fever’ (suffocation), and in one county, 90% of the
chickens died of dust suffocation in 1933. And if their economic woes weren’t
enough then there were the risk to human health and the casualties of dust
pneumonia that came with the drought, black blizzards, and daily dusters. The
worst black blizzards brought with them total blackout – zero visibility – and
occasionally blinded those who survived stranded outside in the storms.64 In the
first fifteen days of July 1936, 2,500 people died in the Midwest due to weather
(some from dust pneumonia, but mostly from heat and drought).65
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In short, the dust bowl was a both a severe economic and ecological crisis.
The next section addresses the policy response from Washington prompted by this
crisis.
Section 3: Policy Response
The agricultural crisis of the 1930s was much more than a crisis of severe
wind erosion. It was primarily a crisis of oversaturated markets and low farm
income. The New Deal agricultural policies of the 1930s aimed first of all to address
the economic crisis, and secondarily, the ecological crisis. To be sure, the two were
very much intertwined. The ecological crisis was the result of the economic
circumstances, namely the speculative growth of agriculture in the previous decades
and the price collapse of the 1930s, and the environmental disasters of the dust
bowl resulted in further economic woes. Some policies addressing the economic
crisis (such as planned scarcity and conservation districts) were ecologically helpful,
but others (price floors and income support) only maintained an agricultural
economy of overproduction and reassured an economic culture that pushed the land
beyond its limits.
In June of 1933, by Executive Order 6084, the tasks of the Federal Farm
Board were transferred to the new Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the
name was changed to the Farm Credit Administration (FCA). The FCA refinanced
farm mortgages at rates more manageable for farmers. Because of its advantageous
policies for farmers, the FCA essentially became the bank of rural America,
providing loans at 5% interest, effectively replacing private banks (though many
rural banks had already gone under). According to Worster, nothing could have
been more radical and had it been applied in any other industry, it would have been
denounced as bolshevism. In its first three years, the FCA loaned more than $600
million to farmers.66
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The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 established the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration (AAA) – a more comprehensive replacement to the
Federal Farm Board. The AAA needed to address the problems farmers were facing
in an oversaturated market. It did so in two ways: limiting production and providing
price supports. The AAA authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to offer direct
payments to farmers in exchange for participation in acreage control programs, for
‘basic crops’, a long list of traditional cash crops. This meant that farmers would
receive a check simply for agreeing to plant less than the amount that AAA would
delegate to each farm, for any given crop, each year. Acreage control payments
provided the AAA with the means to restrict aggregate production quantities. The
acreage control programs, they hoped, could solve overproduction in the long run,
but they still needed to address inadequate farm incomes in the short run. The
Commodity Credit Corporation was established in order to fix prices at the rate of a
government provided non-recourse loan with the commodity serving as collateral
(meaning there was no penalty for failing on the loan besides the government
keeping the commodities). CCC loans were essentially a price floor at which the
government would buy crops. Surplus disposal programs were also heavily utilized,
paying ranchers to slaughter and paying farmers to burn crops, in order to eliminate
surplus market supply. 67
Each commodity program – government assigned acreage allotment in
return for eligibility for the CCC loans that functioned as a price floor – required a
vote of approval by whatever individuals produced that commodity. If more than
one third of votes from producers of each given commodity were against the
program, it would be nulled.68 Nearly every year, every commodity was approved by
vote expect for a few instances. One such instance was the in 1933, in preparation of
1934, the first year of eligibility, when ranchers voted down the beef commodity
program due to a resentfulness for government intervention and federal aid.
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Apparently they preferred to live and die by the free market. But as the drought
worsened, and their livestock were left without feed, ranchers quickly changed their
minds. First, they asked for import restrictions – despite the fact that imported beef
was a nearly negligible share of beef in the US market – and then finally asked for
government aid. From June 1934 to the spring of 1935, the USDA bought 8.3 million
head of cattle for $111.7 million, becoming the largest cattle owner in the world. The
poor had canned meat and the government had 2 million hides that they didn’t
know what to do with.69 Another such vote-down occurred in 1938 with the tobacco
commodity program. Apparently, tobacco growers were through with being told by
the AAA how much they were allowed to plant. But after a single growing season of
rampant overproduction, tobacco growers quickly repented and asked for their
program back. They were eligible again for the 1939 season and the government
immediately bought their 1938 surplus before it could do too much harm to the
domestic market.70 These two notable instances illustrate not only the prideful
resistance of farmers and ranchers in accepting government aid, but also a
resistance to dialing back production, and the seemingly never-ending patience and
mercy of the New Deal agricultural aid.
Though dusters had been blowing on the southern plains for sometime
before 1934, ecological conditions had not yet gotten violent enough to draw the
attention of Washington, which was too preoccupied with the throes of the Great
Depression. After all, the drought and dust storms did to the southern plains what
AAA policy makers aimed to do to the agricultural economy; cut back production.71
It wasn’t until the May 1934 dust storm, which snowed Washington with topsoil
from the Great Plains, that Roosevelt and his cabinet began work on a ‘drought relief
package’. The most vociferous call for help from farmers was for water by means of
dams, irrigation diversions, and deep-water wells. But the federal government had a
different plan. On June 9th, 1934, at Roosevelt’s request, Congress approved $525
million for a ‘drought relief package’. $275 was for cattle owners, providing
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emergency feed loans, and for the purchase and slaughter of livestock, canning and
distributing the meat to the poor. Another $125 million was for destitute farmers,
providing jobs in public works and cash income supplements. The remaining $125
million was used to buy ‘submarginal’ lands from destitute farmers and relocating
the residents to better environments, and also to create work camps for young men,
provide seed loans for new crops, and establish a shelterbelt program in an attempt
to tame the winds. Over the course of the 30s, these programs became staple parts
of the policy effort toward rehabilitating the dust bowl.72 The same year, the AAA
government contracts for not planting for the following year became heavily utilized
by wheat farmers on the plains. Though the policy was mostly unpopular amongst
farmers who believed it was nonsensical to pay farmers to not work, most took
what they could get during the enduring drought of the 1930s when they couldn’t
afford to risk planting.73
In 1935, the government began funding an emergency ‘listing’ program,
paying farmers to plow their land into deep broad furrows perpendicular to the
prevailing winds in order to mitigate wind erosion. Listing programs were widely
popular with farmers. It had always been within the self-interest of farmers to list
their land but broke farmers couldn’t afford the gasoline required to list their fields.
The self-interest of farmers and the goals of government policy were in unison with
the listing programs making them very popular and successful throughout the dust
bowl years.74
Hugh Hammond Bennett, often called ‘Big’ Hugh, is considered the father of
US soil conservation. In 1903, Bennett began working for the Bureau of Soils within
the USDA as a soil surveyor, and by 1933 when funding for addressing the
agricultural crisis became readily available, Bennett had already established himself
as the recognized expert in the US on soil erosion. In 1933, Bennett became director
of the Soil Erosion Service (SES), one of many ad hoc New Deal agencies within the
Department of the Interior. Bennett understood that the implementation of single
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practices (such as listing or terracing the land, which the government had been
providing funds for) would never be a successful conservation policy, but that a
comprehensive program would be needed to address the different conservation
issues on specific farmland. 75 Funding for the SEC was set to expire in 1935 but
Secretary of the Interior, Harold LeClair Ickes, had faith in Big Hugh and assigned
him, along with assistant director of the SEC, Walter C. Lowdermilk, to work on
drafting the legislation for a permanent and comprehensive soil conservation
program. But before their plans could come to fruition within the Department of the
Interior, President Roosevelt made the executive decision to streamline the various
soil conservation programs that were in effect into one agency within the USDA. The
consolidation of soil conservation programs within the USDA would require
congressional approval, and so hearings for the creation of the Soil Conservation
Service were had throughout March and April of 1935. There was already significant
political support for the Soil Conservation Service, but it’s legislation was expedited
by a series of massive black blizzards that brought dust all the way from the
Midwest to the east coast, occasionally darkening the skies of Washington in
midday. 76 Congress granted funding for nearly all of his proposed programs and
with the Soil Conservation Act of 1935, the Soil Conservation Service was born.77
The Agricultural Adjustment program was the primary tool for the federal
government to address agricultural overproduction until it was declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court on January 6th, 1936. The justices’ gripe was
with the federal tax issued on commercial food producers used to fund the new farm
support programs.78 With the repeal of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, the
Soil Conservation Service became the sole means for addressing overproduction in
1936. (The AAA was reestablished in 1937). The Soil Conservation and Domestic
Allotment Act of 1936 was an amendment to the original 1935 legislation that
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increased funding for the SCS in order to help the agency carry the weight of farm
support until a new Agricultural Adjustment program could be passed. Before the
1936 amendment, the SCS continued on much in the same way as the SES had under
the department of the interior, providing research demonstrations across the nation
to show farmers the strategies and benefits of conservation farming, along with the
Conservation Options Program, which provided technical assistance to farmers who
wanted to apply the agronomic techniques displayed in the demonstrations. In
1936, with the amended legislation, the SCS established the Agricultural
Conservation Program (ACP), essentially the first land retirement program, offering
payments to farmers for shifting cultivated land from ‘soil depleting’ crops, to ‘soil
enriching’ ones. However, the job of limiting overproduction proved too big for the
SCS alone and it failed to orchestrate production limits to the same degree as the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration had. Severe drought in 1936 obscured the
fact that conservation programs from the 1936 bill were less effective than the AAA
had been – planting was significantly up in 1936.79
It took two years of finding their footing and being preoccupied with picking
up the slack left behind by the repealed AAA before the SCS could begin
implementing the kind of compressive approach that Bennett had always talked of.
In February 1937, a model state soil conservation district law was drafted by the
SCS, which would allow local farmers to organize their own soil conservation
districts. It was from these districts that conservation practices could transition
from demonstrations to actual practice on private farms. President FDR wrote to
every governor with the recommended legislation.80 In 1937, 22 states passed a soil
conservation law that enabled the creation of local districts, and over time, all 50
states would create similar laws.81 This policy, therefore, depended heavily on
community involvement and the local initiative of farmers to implement
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conservation practices. However, community involvement and localized oversight
proved more difficult in practice than in theory, and Worster claims that many soil
conservation districts fell apart due to lack of local initiative.82 However, the
problem of soil conservation districts failing to coerce farmers into practicing
conservation agriculture isn’t so much that the soil conservation districts dissolved
– there are over 3000 soil conservation districts in operation today83 – the
complications arise because these soil conservation districts rely on voluntary
conservation compliance. Local oversight might help considerably in convincing
farmers to implement conservation practice, but these districts still lack the
authority to coerce farmers into complying if they choose not to do so.84
Nonetheless, Worster pins the failure of the Soil Conservation Districts as the result
of farmers’ ideological opposition to government intervention in agriculture, or at
least they were opposed when it diminished their profits.85
When the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 was passed,
about 20,000 government workers were sent to the southern plains in a desperate
attempt to tame the blowing dunes, the SCS began waging war against the dirt and
the dust. Operation Dust Bowl aimed to plant a vegetative cover and slow the
drifting dunes through the use of contour plowing.86 Also, Roosevelt signed
Executive Order 7028, creating the Resettlement Administration, in order to buy
back the most marginal lands sold under the Homestead Acts – a profound reversal
of American frontier policy over the last near-century.87 By 1940, federal
agricultural support had cost $1.4 billion and was the largest item of the federal
budget. 88
A prominent New Dealer, Lewis Cecil Gray, whom Worster praises as an
insightful conservationist thinker, saw the problem of American land use as the
result of capitalism, broadly defined as personal economic freedom and unlimited
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acquisitiveness. Germany, France, England and Denmark had each come to similar
conclusions and consequently established strict controls over private property in
agriculture. Gray hoped to organize a similar reform of the American agricultural
system, to find some ‘intermediate ground’ between unregulated capitalism and
state owned socialism. 89 This implied the conservative use of privately owned land
through government regulation.
Worster frames Gray’s policies in three stages. First, conserving what
remained of the public domain – the end of homesteading. The Taylor Grazing Act
of 1934 set aside 80 million acres of grassland toward this end. Second were the
sub-marginal land purchases. Formally the ‘Land Utilization Project’, the federal
government aimed in 1934 to buy back 74 million acres of unprofitable and
ecologically damaged land. At its conclusion in 1947, only 11.3 million acres had
been bought. Third, conservation needed to apply on privately owned land – the
most important and most difficult step. The goal was to entice farmers into
voluntarily acting within society’s long-term interests, but it was also necessary to
establish coercion against uncooperative farmers. In this original attempt for
conservation compliance, uncooperative farmers were to be coerced by their peers
through community involvement in Soil Conservation Committee. Gray was
philosophically committed to achieving conservation compliance with small-scale
community land oversight - decentralized county planning committees. Committees
were to be established at both the state and county levels. By the end of the 30s twothirds of the nation’s counties had such committees. But after Secretary of
Agriculture Henry Wallace left the position in 1941, the county committees quickly
dissolved. Worster blames their dissolution on the Farm Bureau (an affiliation of
farmers), land-grant extensions agents, and others with commercial interests in
farming more land, with fewer regulations. With the loss of the grassroots soil
conservation committees went the most important mechanism for establishing
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Gray’s vision of some ‘intermediate ground,’ which could reconcile private
enterprise and soil conserving agriculture.90
The Future of the Great Plains (1936) provides a valuable summary of the
New Deal conservation thinking (and how theory was subverted by political
limitations in practice). The report was authored by a committee of eight persons,
representing four different agencies, each with a different view on the matter –
Worster claims its principal author was Lewis Gray.91 The report stated, radically,
that land destruction was the result of our cultural attitudes – namely the “that man
conquers nature,” “that natural resources are inexhaustible,” “that habitual practices
are best,” that what is good for the individual is good for everybody”, “that an owner
may do with his property as he likes,” “that expanding markets will continue
indefinitely”, and “that free competition coordinates industry and agriculture”.92 By
challenging the justifications and feasibility of private enterprise in agriculture, this
section of the report seems to suggest that far-reaching changes within the
agricultural economy were required, yet somehow, the conclusions of the report fell
far short. Instead, the report blamed land degradation of the plains as the result of
farmers applying humid agricultural practices onto an arid land.93 Such a conclusion
implied the possibility of an agronomic/technical solution, not the necessary
cultural revisions. The solutions proposed included lager farm units, the purchase of
sub-marginal lands, cooperative grazing associations, soil conservation districts,
farm loans conditioned on approved farming practices, country zoning to protect
highly erodible lands, consolidation of governments into more effective units, tax
relief during drought, and a permanent dust bowl agency to implement all of this.94
The application of these policies helped mitigate soil loss and land degradation to a
degree, but against the pressure of expansionary commercial agriculture, US
agricultural policy fell far short of an adequate solution. The 30s proved a mere
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momentary lapse in our growth culture; soon the memories and lessons of the black
blizzards faded and the southern plains rejoined the nation’s expansionary race
ahead.95
Lessons Learned
There are many various links in the causal chain of the dust bowl, but
Worster provides a persuasive argument that ‘capitalist’ values are a common
element for each contributing cause of the dust bowl.
Blaming the dust bowl on a freakishly extended drought implicitly pardons
farmers and others with interests in commercial agriculture, because it implies the
event occurred by no human fault. Worster makes clear that although drought was a
necessary cause, it was not a sufficient one. Droughts have come and gone through
the southern plains for millennia without such a disaster. Tree ring evidence in
Nebraska has shown the semi-regularity of extended droughts, including one lasting
26 years in the 16th century.96 The destruction of the native sod, in favor of
cultivated land combined with drought and high winds (common occurrences on the
southern plains) physically created the dust bowl 97 – not drought alone.
The economic and political forces that contributed to the destruction of
native sod in an area ill-suited for agriculture were the advent of industrial
technology, Jeffersonian public policy (Homestead Acts), and capitalistic growth
culture. Worster discounts the independent roles of both industrial technology and
the Homestead Acts by arguing that each contributed to the dust bowl only because
they occurred within a capitalistic growth culture.
The film, “The Plow That Broke the Plains” (1936), made by Pare Lorentz for
the Farm Security Administration, blamed the dust bowl on the advent of industrial
machinery, yet paradoxically concluded that the same technology could be utilized
responsibly, post-New Deal. And so Worster argues, the more fundamental cause of
Worster, Dust Bowl, 197.
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the dust bowl was the kind of farming practiced with this machinery, or even more
fundamentally, the cultural values determining those farming practices. He writes,
“The attitude of capitalism – industrial and pre-industrial – toward the earth was
imperial and commercial; none of its ruling values taught environmental humility,
reverence, or restraint. This was the cultural impetus that drove Americans into the
grassland and determined the way they would use it.”98 Worster argues that the
advent of the tractor and industrial farm machinery in the early 20th century were
never pure technological advances in practice, but were only ever technological
advances in the hands of a commercialized society. Technological advancement in
itself could never have led to the dust bowl. Instead, industrial capitalism –
mechanized process combined with investment, for a profit, led to the dust bowl. 99
Although the Homestead Acts and the related Jeffersonian ideals of an
expansionary agriculturally based democracy were necessary causes for the
creation of the dust bowl, Worster blames the capitalist ethos as more fundamental.
One might argue that Jeffersonian ideals are responsible for the dust bowl in the
same way as the capitalist ethos; they were both underlying cultural values. And just
as the capitalist ethos is problematic in it’s drive for growth and disregard for
ecological limits, Jeffersonian ideals would evolve over the 19th and 20th centuries
into a cultural attitude of expansionary optimism, occasionally spouting pure lunacy,
assuming that rain would follow the plow and that there exist no deserts, only lands
not yet tamed by man.100 It was this misplaced confidence in westward settlement
that resulted in a severe imbalance between the farmer and the ecology of the
plains. The Homestead Acts (of 1862 and the enlarged version in 1909 that made
available the southern plains) were entirely Jeffersonian and without this land
policy, the surge of settlement and destruction of the native sod between 1910 and
1930 would not have occurred nearly so rapidly.101 In this sense, the Homestead
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Acts were the greatest political force that contributed to the dust bowl. However,
Worster diminishes the blame on Jeffersonian ideals, stating,
Both [Jefferson’s expansionary democracy and capitalism] were expressions
of the same self-minded, individualistic dynamism that ignored complex
ecological realities. But the capitalist ethos was by far the more important,
for it replaced man’s attachments to the earth, which Jefferson still cherished,
with an all out dedication to cash, it replaced a rural economy aimed at
sufficiency with one driving toward unlimited wealth.102
Had Jeffersonian ideals of an agricultural democracy been present in a society
without the capitalist ethos, the speculative commercial growth in agriculture that
led to the dust bowl would never have occurred.
Droughts had occurred many times on the southern plains without ecological
catastrophe; it was only once settlers exchanged the native sod for cultivated
acreage that the dust bowl became possible. Native sod was quickly exchanged for
cash crops because the commercial agriculture of America in the early 20th century
possessed the advent of industrial agricultural technology and the still growing
legacy of Jeffersonian land policy. Thus, Worster comes to the conclusion that the
fundamental cause of the dust bowl was commercial agriculture. Commercial
agriculture is a manifestation of capitalistic culture, driven primarily by a desire for
extracting greater wealth from the soil. The dust bowl was not a freak
environmental disaster that unexpectedly and unavoidably wrought disaster upon
the Great Plains, but was instead the predictable result of an American capitalist
culture upon the land, which promoted ecologically destructive farming practices.103
To be clear, blaming cultural values greatly diminishes the blame on
individual farmers within that culture. If the problem was the individualistic
expansionary growth culture, then the US agricultural market was simply an
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expression of this culture, and farmers, the individual producers, were merely
performing the functions of the market. Individual farmers were responding to the
market, which was trending towards larger and more efficient farming, while
overproduction pushed farmers into expanding the farm in order to stay financially
solvent. Short run market forces dominated the decision making of farmers. There
was certainly an element of greed and shortsightedness, but it wasn’t as if urbanites
were any more constrained in their commercialism during this era. Worster sees the
simultaneous events of the dust bowl and the Wall Street collapse as products of a
common cause: “a common economic culture, in factories and on farms, based on
unregulated private capital seeking its own unlimited increase.”104 Individual
farmers became little more than cogs in the wheel of US and international markets.
Worster’s Dust Bowl is an explicit argument that the capitalistic values of
American culture caused the dust bowl. In contrast, Timothy Egan’s book, The Worst
Hard Time: The Untold Story of Those Who Survived the Great American Dust Bowl is
less of an argument for what really caused the dust bowl (though he takes up that
question as well), but more of a defense of those who lived through the dust bowl.
Revealing the personal accounts of various farmers and rural communities, Egan
makes it clear how “settlers lacked both the knowledge and the incentive necessary”
to avoid the mistakes which led to the dust bowl. Egan identified the Homestead
Acts, technological changes and speculative agricultural investments, as the
institutional forces, which led to the dust bowl. More land was continuously plowed
up into the 1930s, first incentivized by high grain prices from increased wartime
demand during WWI, then by increased production capacity from mechanized farm
equipment. As oversupply ensued and prices dropped, individuals were incentivized
to produce more in order to cover their operating costs and pay off mortgages on
new machinery. In 1929, farmers needed, on average, three times the biggest
allotted homestead in order to simply cover operating costs.105 When the market
became oversaturated, it was economical for farmers to leave fields uncultivated,
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bare and susceptible to wind erosion. In these ways, individual farmers were
reactionaries to larger institutional forces, not the primary causes of the dust
bowl.106
Worster provides a compelling theory for why the dust bowl happened, but
on the topic of alternatives or solutions, his direction is vague and a bit muddled. To
do so, as a historian, would be more than is expected of him, yet simultaneously, it
feels unfair to argue against commercial agriculture without providing some
suggested alternative. Of course he suggests a revision of cultural values, but exactly
what that looks like is left very vague – some ‘intermediate ground’ between
unregulated capitalism and socialist state-owned agriculture. Although he quotes
Karl Marx’s, Capital in the epigraph of his introduction - “All progress in capitalistic
agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the laborer, but of robbing
the soil” - Worster is not a Marxist himself. In the afterword of the 2004 edition of
Dust Bowl he writes, “I never intended… to offer a ‘Marxist’ interpretation of Great
Plains history, for after all, Marx missed quite a few things and turned out to be a
bad prophet.”107
Worster distances himself from the philosophy of Karl Marx primarily
because he appears unwilling to entirely abandon the system of private property in
agriculture. I think this is why he evokes Lewis Gray, the New Dealer who hoped to
salvage privately owned commercial agriculture through careful government
oversight. Unlike any other person in his historical account, Worster frames Gray in
a very positive light, as an especially forward thinker in his time. But Worster also
suggests that Gray’s intermediate ground between capitalism and socialism became
too moderate to be wholly effective; it failed to establish any real control over the
industry in terms of stemming its commercial drive for growth. This was proven
when commercial interests from within overcame the decentralized, county soil
conservation committees. Worster recognizes the influence and ability of private
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capitalistic competition to derail obstacles in the way of financial growth. By
pointing out the shortcoming’s of Gray’s policy’s, Worster implies that in order for
this ‘intermediate ground’ to be successful, it must be more aggressively anti-freemarket than what the New Deal established. In my opinion, Worster is necessarily
vague on alternatives and solutions, because from his stance - that capitalist values
must go – the logical solution is the dissolution of private capital in agriculture, a
step that he is not willing to take.
There are important lessons that can be drawn from the dust bowl years and
agricultural policy in the 1930s; lessons that can be applied toward practical policy
solutions in the 21st century. One such lesson is that farmers will often prove
defensive and resistant to policy reform. There were two kinds of defensiveness
from farming during the dust bowl: defensiveness for the sake of the whole industry
and status quo, and defensiveness for the sake of personal fault and responsibility.
During the dust bowl farmers became defensive about modern agriculture in
general and its common practices. As evidence mounted that their agricultural
practices were not in harmony with the environment, many farmers clung to the
belief that their way of farming was unproblematic. The farmers of the southern
plains were optimists: optimistic that dry land farming would be successful;
optimistic for one’s own land and a faith that its produce would send them up the
social ladder; optimistic that the land existed only for their cultivation, that there
would be no consequence for destroying the natural ecology; optimistic that
tomorrow would always bring greater riches. The black blizzards seriously
challenged such optimism and contradicted the plainsmen’s thinking; nature would
not yield unlimited riches so easily. How did farmers respond to such a challenge?
Worster says, “Changes in attitudes did occur, to be sure, but the most incredible
fact of the dirty thirties was the tenacity of bourgeois optimism and its
imperviousness to all warnings.”108 The black blizzards suggested that the southern
plains were no place for farming. People are never so eager to accept that their way
of life is flawed. Worster generalizes the progression of local attitudes as: never
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anticipating a serious drought during settlement, underestimating the seriousness
of the drought once it started (keeping faith in a better tomorrow), denying its
seriousness and defending the value of their home region, asking for limited help,
but then demanding federal aid quickly when and where they want it without
strings attached, supporting only optimistic politicians and ever denying the need
for radical reform, and grudgingly accepting the aid that is given while bitterly
awaiting the day when the plains are ‘normal’ and prosperous again.109 Farmers in
the 1930s never wanted reform, only ‘relief’. Worster frames it as a matter of pride.
‘Relief’ implied they had done no wrong but were simply overcome by some natural
disaster. Worster writes, “Intense pride in themselves and their achievements,
which is the natural emotion of a frontier community, nonetheless required that the
asking be severely constrained: there was to be no confession of failure; work was
infinitely preferable to the dole; relief was to be only a temporary arrangement.”110
The dust bowl also illustrated a personal defensiveness in response to blame.
If the defensiveness of farmers for their industry in general was ever overcome,
there was also a personal defensiveness against any blame for the dust bowl or for
the fracture between agriculture and ecology. Not just for farmers, but also for every
individual immediately responsible for some questionable industry practice, there
will always be this kind of personal defensiveness. If Egan’s argument is accepted,
the personal defensiveness of farmers during the 1930s was legitimate. Farmers
were primarily reactionaries, sailing in the direction of the economic winds,
performing their function as commercially competitive units. In this sense, none the
individuals were fundamentally responsible. But ‘bailing out’ the whole industry
because the individuals appear innocent becomes practically complicated, because
of the long run consequences. Providing relief and implementing policies that
salvaged US agriculture in the 1930s was like a patch-job on broken or
fundamentally flawed system. Private enterprise was still far from internalizing the
externalities of its practices and respecting ecological limits. Also, it seems unfair to
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always pawn off the responsibility of farmers to greater institutional incentives –
maybe farmers who were still plowing virgin lands in 1930s weren’t really so guilty
because they were desperately trying to avoid bankruptcy, but what about the land
grant agents and farmers who were antagonistic towards Dr. Gray’s localized soil
conservation committees in the 1940s? Where does personal accountability come
into play? For the practicality of policy makers, often it does not.
Both kinds of defensiveness (for the status quo of farming, and for personal
responsibility) are unsurprising. Whether its farmers in the 1930s, or today, people
tend to not like to be told how to farm by the government. This contradicts their
political ideals of American economic liberty. Bennett, Gray, and the other New Deal
conservationists aimed to construct a conservation oversight system that would be
amenable with these ideals of American economic liberty through the use of
voluntary soil conservation districts. The idea was that coercing farmers into
implementing conservation on private land wasn’t an appropriate role for the
federal government, and that locally run committees would be better suited for
conservation oversight. Even on the local scale, voluntary conservation compliance
failed to include every private farm in the way that Bennett’s ideal comprehensive
conservation program would, or in the way that Dr. Gray’s intermediate ground
hoped to do. The dust bowl illustrates how people generally resist when the
government, or their peers, tells them precisely how to farm. For this reason, tax
incentives should be a more practical policy than conservation compliance through
unpopular, subjective, and corruptible localized oversight. With a soil erosion tax,
farmers are free to be defensive and continue their way of farming if they wish, but
will pay higher taxes accordingly.
Another important lesson to be learned from the dust bowl is that farmers,
like everyone, follow the path of economic incentives. Indeed, there are exceptions,
where farmers choose to implement costly conservation practices for the sake of
good stewardship. But such approbation should not be expected. Whether this is an
eternal fact, or limited to our capitalistic culture is irrelevant for the purpose of this
thesis. The revision of our cultural values, to suddenly remove profit-seeking
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behavior from agriculture, is a highly impractical political solution, despite whether
or not it is ideal.
The problem of how to incentivize conservation has been around since the
SCS began demonstrations in the 1930s. For these demonstrations, the SCS would
buy or rent out eroding land from farmers, then bring in the experts who would
implement all of the available conservation measures for reducing erosion: contour
cultivation, strip cropping, terracing, stopping gullies, etc. The SCS then advertised
around the area – come see and learn how to make a conservation plan for your own
farm. The demonstration projects certainly helped promote awareness and
exposure of conservation farming, but they did little for the actual implementation
of these practices on private farms. Individual farmers were busy with their own
farm, and not eager to take on additional conservation projects that required
expensive heavy machinery and technical expertise that most farmers lacked.111
This is the fundamental challenge of conservation policy: how to apply conservation
onto privately owned land. Clearly, demonstrations alone were not enough, and so
the policies of the SCS quickly evolved into incentivizing land retirement and the
Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP) was created. Then, the SCS implemented
the grassroots democratic system of soil conservation districts in order to promote
local involvement and support. This system has proved effective at increasing
farmers’ involvement in conservation, to a degree, but it relies on voluntary
involvement and there is still no means for coercing farmers that choose, often for
financial reasons, not to practice the most advanced conservation agriculture.
The simple fact is that farmers and agribusiness are profit-seeking producers
in the market. If the political impracticality of legislation that totally defies or
constrains the economic interests of farmers has not already become apparent from
examining the dust bowl, a brief examination of modern farm policy since then in
Part B of this essay, will reinforce the fact that policies enacted by US Congress
almost always are within the financial interests of farmers. US farm policy has

Douglas Helms, “The Preparation of the Standard State Soil Conservation Districts Law: An
Interview with Philip Glick,” USDA SCS, Economics and Social Sciences Division, (1990), 13.
111

40

historically been a policy of providing economic security, and also global advantage
to US farmers. Existing conservation policies certainly utilize incentives, but they do
so in a piecemeal way and are often underfunded. A soil erosion tax could prove a
more effective and streamlined policy for incentivizing conservation practices.
The history of the dust bowl illustrates the reality and even law-like nature of
economic competition. The conservation policies of the 1930s fell short of
conditioning agriculture in equilibrium with the ecology primarily because of
economic competition. Karl Marx didn’t believe that a revolution of the proletariat
was possible on a local level, because wherever such a revolution happened, it
would be at an economic disadvantage to whatever neighboring nation squeezed
the maximum productivity out of its land and labor. That is why he rallied for the
workers of the world unite, because he could think of no defense against more
industrial and productive societies. Economic competition is the modern mode of
nature’s law. Be fit or die; be price competitive or go bankrupt. Economies of scale
are a reality, and there are propensities for agricultural units of industrial efficiency.
The drive for commercial competition tends to ignore obstacles to short-run profit,
such as ecological limits and long run externalities. The tenacity of private
competition to always grow in wealth is difficult to stem. And when the nation
drives ever onward in economic growth, how can the farmer not be expected to do
the same? To paraphrase George Steinbeck from the Grapes of Wrath, ‘When the
monster stops growing it dies. It can’t stay one size.’
Worster reinforces this idea of economic competition as the modern law of
nature and the pioneers of industry dragging everyone else along behind them. He
does so especially when he highlights another wind erosion disaster that occurred
in the late 50s and early 60s in the USSR. Food production had been falling behind
demand and so Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Premier, ordered the collectivist farms
to plow 40 million hectares of semi arid grasslands. Droughts soon lead to wind
erosion, damaging 17 million acres. His decision led to widespread criticism for his
disregard of the local ecology. In his defense he wrote, “Put Comrade Barayev [the
critic] into conditions of capitalistic competition and his farm, with its present
system of plantings, probably would not survive. Could he ever compete with a large
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capitalist farm if he keeps 32 percent of his plowed land in cleaned fallow?”112 There
is a propensity for agricultural practices that are most immediately productive,
regardless of long-run sustainability. If markets become oversupplied from too
much production, prices will drop and farm units that produce relatively less –
perhaps because they behave responsibly by alternating cultivation with clean
fallows instead of using chemical fertilizers, consequently reaping smaller profits –
are the first to go bankrupt on the crash course to market equilibrium. The tendency
of the market to reward price competitiveness and ignore ecological externalities is
why the authors of, A History of World Agriculture, concerned with the ecological
trajectory of global agriculture and land degradation, call for the end of the
“international agricultural price war.”113 Arguably, agriculture is a unique industry
and we cannot afford to be swayed by the whims of price competition when it is the
livelihood of farmers and the soil resources of all consumers at stake.
Ultimately, the dust bowl illustrates the paradigm between private
enterprise in agriculture and ecological limits. Individual farmers in the market
react to short run market forces in ways that often ignore long run ecological
externalities such as soil erosion. An appropriate policy response to the dilemma of
how to address conservation practices on privately owned land is that of Lewis
Gray; aiming to establish some intermediate ground between unregulated
capitalism and state owned socialism. State owned socialism might be undesirable
for some ideological reasons, but it is appealing because the central authority could
then easily regulate land use without worrying about violating the ownership rights
of farmers and landowners. Unregulated capitalism is appealing in the sense that it
the path of least political resistance; farmers in the US generally prefer to go
unregulated. Gray sought to establish an intermediate ground between the two by
establishing conservation compliance through localized community oversight. This
method for coercion proved ineffective in practice, as there was never enough local
political support and the committees eventually dissolved. Worster suggests that
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Gray’s intermediate ground failed because it was too moderate, too close to
unregulated capitalism, but really, it failed because it was not a pragmatic policy
approach, it depended upon local grassroots involvement, something there was no
political momentum for. It isn’t that we need an intermediate ground that is more
liberal, or more conservative – we need a conservation policy that accepts the
political climate and implements a policy that does not require active grassroots
political involvement. A soil erosion tax would be successful where voluntary
conservation compliance has failed, because its implementation does not rely on the
enthusiastic involvement of farmers.

Part B
Agricultural Policy Reform: The Argument for a Soil Erosion Tax
Practicing agriculture has always been an ecological challenge. The first
section of Part B will examine a brief account of the failed agricultures of expired
civilizations, and then examine the ‘permanence’ of modern agriculture. To be sure,
the practice of agriculture often leads to land degradation generally. Soil is a
complex resource and its degradation often comes in the form of soil organic matter
(SOM) loss, increased salinity, acidification, nutrient depletion, and the decline of
microbial activity. However, for the practicality of this essay, the ‘permanence’ of
agriculture is weighed in terms of soil erosion. How much soil volume is retained
under the practice of agriculture? Following the archeological account of failed
agricultures, the rest of Section One examines our current understanding of soil
formation rates and soil erosion rates – the improved understanding of each is
fundamental to accurately gauging the sustainability of ongoing farming practices.
Section One concludes by pointing out farming practices that improve soil erosion
and soil formation rates. The greater implementation of these conservation
practices must be the end-goal of any government conservation policy.
Before moving on to the policy suggestions of Section Three, Section Two
lays out a brief history of US farm policy. The history of modern US farm policy
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reinforces some of the lessons from the dust bowl, and also illustrates the purpose,
as well as the necessity and complexity of US agricultural policy. Understanding the
failed attempts of conservation policies in the past and the general role that farm
policy plays is critical in order to justify any agricultural policy for the present and
future.
Section Three of Part B then lays out the prescribed policy solutions towards
reconciling the fracture between private enterprise farming and ecological limits. A
soil erosion tax is a practical means for incentivizing the greater implementation of
conservation practices in order to improve soil erosion and formation rates to that
of a permanent agriculture. Section Two shows that the traditional approach of
conservation policy has been a mostly ineffective paradigm and warrants a new
approach. Therefore, I argue that conservation policy ought to employ a Pigouvian
Tax strategy in order to internalize the externalities of soil erosion. Section Three
examines the practicality and ramifications of such a soil erosion tax.

Section 1: A Permanent Agriculture
1.1

US Farming in an Archeological Context: Another Attempt at a Permanent

Agriculture
Agriculture has always been a precarious endeavor. The dangers of
accelerated soil erosion due to agriculture have been recognized since at least the
time of Plato and Aristotle.114 Many more recent studies suggest a strong association
between soil erosion and the decline of civilizations.115 In 1938 and 1939, Walter
Clay Lowdermilk, Assistant Director of the USDA Soil Conservation Service and
colleague of ‘Big’ Hugh Bennett, surveyed the lands of England, Holland, France,
Italy, North Africa, and the Near East, in the interests of learning from the history of
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others and establishing a permanent agriculture in our relatively young nation.116
Lowdermilk’s account of the history of agriculture, soil erosion and the decline of
civilizations, specifically in the Near East (today this is Israel, Syria and Lebanon)
are especially haunting, and his broad analysis of agriculture extremely insightful.
Lowdermilk saw the world with the eyes of an agricultural archeologist
reading the stories of ancient civilizations written on the land. He believed that the
partnership between farmers and the land is the rock foundation for every
civilization. Efficient agriculture was the birth of human civilization, for once food is
produced without demanding all available labor, individuals begin to specialize in
various crafts, and exchange the goods they produce for food instead. And as food
production becomes more labor efficient, the division of labor continues to develop
into that of a complex civilization. 117 In accredit of modern civilization and its rockfoundation, modern agriculture is indeed extremely labor efficient. In 2006, a
common industrialized American farm operates at an average of 480
acres/worker/year.118
Lowdermilk noted that throughout human civilization, failures in
establishing a permanent agriculture have been more frequent than successes.119
Archeologists believe that the birth of human civilization happened approximately
7000 years ago in the fertile plains of Mesopotamia and the Valley of the Nile where
irrigation and tilling allowed for more efficient agriculture. On Mesopotamia,
Lowdermilk writes,
For at least 11 empires have risen and fallen in this tragic land in 7,000 years.
It is a story of a precarious agriculture practiced by people who lived and
grew up under the threat of raids and invasions from the denizens of
grasslands and the desert, and of the failure of their irrigation canals because
of silt.120
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Muddy irrigation canals would slow their flow over time due to the build up of
sediment. As these irrigation canals expanded into vast systems, it required an evergreater labor force to keep the canals from choking up with silt. The ruling empires
kept slaves for the task of digging out the canals, such as the biblical Israelites: “By
the rivers of Babylon we sat and wept when we remembered Zion.” (Psalm 137:1).
Unlike other failed agricultures around the world, the decline of Mesopotamia was
not due to soil loss from erosion, but instead the fragile irrigation system proved
their demise when wars or other disruptions took place. Lowdermilk posited that,
“Mesopotamia is capable of supporting as great a population as it ever did and
greater when modern engineering makes use of reinforced concrete construction
for irrigation works and powered machinery to keep canal systems open.”121
Similarly, Lowdermilk suggested that farming in the Valley of the Nile has remained
suitable for about 6000 years because soil erosion has been essentially a null issue –
the annual flooding of the river spreads thin layers of silt from the uplands over the
valley depositing new fertile soil.
Lowdermilk contrasts the relatively successful agricultures of the Nile and
Mesopotamian river valleys (ancient farmland that still contains fertile soil) with the
more mountainous lands of Israel, Syria and Lebanon. His survey of the land of Sinai,
where Moses and his Israelites supposedly wandered with their herds of grazing
animals for 40 years, found the epitome of desolation by accelerated soil erosion.
Brown hillsides had been severely eroded into deep ephemeral gullies, often down
to rock.
Throughout Israel, Lowdermilk found that the land of milk and honey had
been degraded over the centuries. The red soil of the area has washed away in many
places down to bedrock. Agriculture is still practiced in the valleys where the soil
has washed into, but with every hard rain, more soil flows away through great
ephemeral gullies. In the sloping lands around Jerusalem, agriculture remained
practiced in the areas where large stonewalls formed terraces to prevent erosion.
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However, even where these careful practices have been implemented, the damage of
thousands of years of grazing and cultivation is clear.122
In Syria and Jordan, Lowdermilk found even greater desolation and evidence
that the agriculture of an ancient civilization had worn upon the land until the soil
was utterly exhausted, marking the expiration and desertification of their once
bountiful land. He writes,
Still farther to the north in Syria, we came upon a region where erosion had
done its worst in an area of more than a million acres of rolling limestone
country between Hama, Aleppo, and Antioch. French archaeologists, Father
Mattern, and others found in this man-made desert more than 100 dead
cities.123
The scattered ruins of these small cities suggest that this land was once fertile, until
overgrazing or excessive tilling resulted in extreme soil erosion, decimating the
civilization of these hill-peoples.
Lowdermilk also examined similar stories of success and failure in North
Africa and Europe, and then looked towards the application of learned lessons in the
US. Essentially, Lowdermilk found that where there are slopes, erosion eventually
compromises the ability to practice agriculture. In 1953, he warned of the path on
which we were (and still are) trending. He said, because most of our land is
somewhat sloped, approximately 300 million acres of our 400 some-million acres of
US farmland were eroding faster than soil was being formed. He admitted that we
have not yet found a solution to soil erosion but that the application of certain soil
conservation practices, like leaving a layer crop residue to cover the soil, can
improve our rates of soil erosion. In the words of Lowdermilk, “Here clearly is our
objective for a permanent agriculture, namely, to safeguard the physical body of the
soil resource and to keep down erosion wastage under cultivation as nearly as
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possible to this geologic norm of erosion under natural vegetation.”124 The policy
recommendations of this essay maintain this same objective.
1.2

A Tolerable Rate of Soil Loss
More than half a century since Lowdermilk’s report, soil erosion rates have

improved, but agriculture in the US remains far from ‘permanent’. One can simplify
the issue with the following mathematical expression:125
Tc = S/( E – F )
Where: Tc = critical time, S = initial soil thickness, E = soil erosion rate,
F = soil formation rate
A permanent agriculture would operate with an erosion rate equivalent to the
formation rate – we can only afford to lose soil at the rate it is renewed. Establishing
a permanent agriculture then requires data on both the erosion rates under
cultivation, and the rate of soil formation in order to balance our E-value against our
F-value. The problem is that there is an extreme dearth of data necessary for
estimating each value and for determining a tolerable rate of soil loss.
1.3

Soil Formation Rates
The contemporary literature is extremely muddled in its references when it

comes to soil formation. Leonard C. Johnson comically points that most authors
today cite David Pimentel et al. “Land Degradation: Effects on Food and Energy
Resources” (1976) on the rate of soil formation, but Pimentel et al. in fact cited
David Hudson (1971)126 (Pimentel and Hudson were fellow professors at Cornell),

Ibid, 26.
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Academy of Sciences of the United States of America vol. 104 no. 33 (2007), 13271, Accessed February
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who in turn referenced ‘Big’ Hugh Bennett’s magnum opus, Soil Conservation. 127
Bennett’s values were admittedly speculations. Pimentel et al. also cited others who,
Johnson argues were of little significance to Pimentel’s conclusion that soil is formed
under natural conditions at a rate of 1 inch every 300 to 1000 years.128 Hudson then
made the references entirely circular in 1981 when the republished edition of
Hudson’s work cited Pimentel et al. (1976), no longer Bennett (1939) as the source
for his soil formation estimates. Pimentel became the go-to expert on soil formation
estimates for some and has consequently been discredited by others as an alarmist
and for purporting to know what no one knows. 129
Despite a lack of data, the USDA estimated the rate of soil formation in the
1950s, following the concerns of farmers, the SCS and men like Lowdermilk and
Bennett. The established soil loss tolerance levels became known as ‘T-values’. Tvalues supposedly represent the rate of soil formation and therefore the tolerable
rate of soil loss for a permanent and sustainable agriculture. Generally, soil
conservation programs establish T values at 5 – 12 tons/hectares/year - equivalent
to .4 to 1 mm/year of erosion (assuming a soil bulk density of 1.2g/cm3).130 T-values
are assigned site specifically and are dependent on the soil depth.131 If these Tvalues are supposed to stand for the rate of soil erosion that is equivalent to soil
formation, the claim is that soil forms 1 inch every 25.4 to 63.7 years. The accuracy
of these T-values, as well as the economic and political motivations behind their
establishment, has been highly contested.132
David Montgomery of the University of Washington finds in his 2007 study
that in fact, T-values are roughly ten times greater than the rate of soil
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production.133 Montgomery admits the contentions of soil scientists on this topic
have so far remained compromised by a lack of data and so he compiled 201 various
different studies over recent years (excluding most sediment yield studies, which he
finds an inaccurate method for estimating soil erosion) and attempts to empirically
ground some general claims about soil erosion and formation. Montgomery’s data
supports the claims that geological erosion rates and the soil formation rates are
indeed roughly equal on non-cultivated land, except in very steep terrain where the
geological erosion rate is higher. Therefore, most terrain can sustain a certain layer
of topsoil overtime. His results found that gentle slopes (“cratons”) have geological
erosion rates between .0001 to .01 mm/year (3.94 x 10-6 to .000394 inches/year),
moderate slopes (“soil-mantled terrain”) have geological erosion rates between .001
and 1 mm/year (3.94 x 10-5 to .0394 inches/year), and that steep slopes (“alpine”)
have geological erosion rates between .1 and >10 mm/year (.00394 to >.394
inches/year).
However, classifying soil formation rates in respect to terrain, slope, and
geological erosion rates alone ignores many of the fundamental aspects of soil
formation. The University of Minnesota Extension website lists the following as the
five soil-forming factors: 1) parent material, that is the original geologic material
from which the soil is formed; 2) climate; 3) the slope and terrain; 4) The organisms
that live on or in the soil; 5) The duration during which the other four elements have
interacted.134 And so soil formation rates not only contingent upon the slope and
terrain, but also (perhaps more fundamentally) contingent upon the parent
material, climate, and living organisms involved. For the decision making of farmers
already operating on some given land, the geologic parent material and climate are
relatively unchangeable135, and so arguably the most important factor of farmers
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and policy makers to adjust and improve soil formation rates is factor four, the
organisms that live on or in the soil.
The fourth soil-forming factor refers to the microscopic ecosystem of
microorganisms and the plant material that grows from the soil, as well as the
insects, worms, and burrowing animals that live in that ecosystem. In a forest, the
soil formation rate depends on the decomposition of the forest litter. In a cultivated
field, the soil formation rate depends on the decomposition of crop litter. The soil
formation rate of any given field is dependent on the crop residue management
practices, however crop residue like corn-stover has economic value as an animal
forage source136 or as a biofuel feedstock137. So every corn farmer must decide how
much corn-stover to keep on the field as a crop litter in order to renew soil biomass
and organic matter, and how much to harvest for forage and feedstock. Richard Hess
and Doug Karlen et al. take up the feedstock question, concerned about the loss of
SOM but recognizing the reality of market forces, which incentivize farmers into
selling their corn-stover to ethanol producers. They conclude that sustainable cornstover removal rates, that is, the amount of crop litter necessary to maintain a
healthy SOM and prevent soil erosion, are usually below 40% of total corn-stover.138
But regardless of market forces, it’s important to recognize the role that crop
residue plays by preserving SOM and contributing to general soil health.
Conservation farming must not only consider how to lower the rates of soil erosion,
but also how to increase the rates of soil formation.
1.4

Soil Erosion Rates
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The USDA has made progress over the past several decades in estimating the
rates of soil erosion on agricultural land. Although previous attempts had been
made in the early 20th century to express the association between land topography
and soil erosion (by water), it wasn’t until the 1965 that the USDA developed the
Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE).139 This equation was revised by Wischmeir and
Smith again in 1978, and significantly revised in 1997, creating the Revised
Universal Soil Loss Equation (RUSLE). Although the 1997 revision improved
estimates, there were shortcomings to the methodology that limited its applicability.
USLE and RUSLE equations did very poorly in the short run, because they did not
consider soil depositions. A new kind of soil erosion estimate was developed by
Flanagan and Nearing of the USDA throughout the 1980s, and finally in 1995, the
Water Erosion Prediction Project was documented and validated.140 WEPP
improved upon previous models because of its attention to detail - it includes
factors for plant growth, residue management and decomposition rates, water
balance (snow, snowmelt, soil saturation), weather generation, tillage, rill and
interrill soil detachment, sediment transport and deposition and sediment particle
size distribution.141 RUSLE has recently been revised again so that the most recent
evolution of this model is RUSLE 2.142
The Iowa Daily Erosion Project (IDEP) is an ongoing collaboration of
scientists at Iowa State University, USDA’s National Soil Erosion Research Lab,
USDA’s National Library for Agriculture and the Environment, and the University of
Iowa. For the last decade, the IDEP has been working to overcome the challenges on
the forefront soil erosion estimates. The IDEP that aims to improve soil erosion
estimates across the state of Iowa by focusing on the role of localized heavy
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rainstorms that dramatically affect erosion. Other soil erosion models estimate
water erosion by using rainfall averages over the long run, but soil erosion doesn’t
occur on average; erosion by water occurs when and where it rains. Previous
estimates for large areas fail to account so precisely for localized and highly weather
variable nature of soil erosion.143 Richard Cruse and the other scientists at the IDEP
argue that soil erosion models like RUSLE and RUSLE2 that use long run
precipitation averages significantly underestimate soil erosion because of the
extreme volumes of soil lost in heavy storms.144 And the work of the IDEP will only
become more relevant in the future as weather patterns intensify with climate
change.145
Iowa Daily Erosion Project uses the WEPP model, drawing data from 1997
USDA NRI report for field measurements, and from the Hydraulic Rainfall Analysis
Project (HRAP) which uses advanced weather radar technology across the state of
Iowa, for precipitation data every 15 minutes in 4 square mile increments. NRI
report provides various data points within every township (36 mi2) but does not
specify precisely where each data point is within each township. The IDEP then
creates a distribution of possible erosion rates within each township, running
calculations with every combination of NRI field specifications against every
precipitation measurement in each township. The minimum values of these
distributions represent the erosion estimates if the least amount of rainfall in the
township occurred on the most well protected and least erodible land, while the
maximum values represent the worse case scenario, the greatest amount of rainfall
on the most erodible land. Both the minimum and maximum values of the IDEP
distributions likely occurred somewhere in that township on that day.146
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The results of the IDEP are alarming. Erosion is often worst in the spring
before planted crops can take root and when the ground is already saturated with
snowmelt. A three day storm from May 5-7th 2010, resulted in IDEP soil loss
estimates with the most vulnerable land in every township eroding at rates greater
than the annual T-value (12.35 tons/hectares/year). The most vulnerable land in 10
of Iowa’s townships was estimated to have eroded at the rate of 100
tons/hectare/day. It’s possible that these values represent only the single worst
field of the township. However, it’s also possible that these values represent many
similar fields. Regardless, these results illustrate the catastrophic effects that a
single storm can have on vulnerable land.
Richard Cruse of Iowa State University contends that soil erosion modeling is
limited by two major factors: the lack of field measurements (soil type, topography,
crop management, conservation practices), and the use of long-run averages for
precipitation data.147 Although the IDEP does much to overcome the challenges of
precipitation data and the weather dependent and localized nature of soil erosion, it
still faces the problem of a lack of site-specific field data. Soil scientists constructing
erosion models over vast areas don’t have nearly enough field measurement data.
Surely databases within the USDA exist, such as the 1997 NRI report used by the
IDEP, but such resources prove far more useful in garnering data on the soil type
which is generally more consistent across a township, than on the site specific
topography, and annual farming and conservation practices.148
Besides the lack of field data, another significant barrier to soil erosion
models is the failure to account for gullies. All of the major existing soil erosion
models estimate sheet and rill erosion, cannot yet account for the formation of daily
and ephemeral gullies, channels that form as it rains. In their review of the history
and evolution of soil erosion models, Laflen and Flanagan (the lead developer of
WEPP), suggests that the next major break through in soil erosion models needs to
be an account of these ephemeral gullies.149 A National Resource Conservation
R. Cruse et al., “Daily Estimates of Rainfall, Water Runoff, and Soil Erosion in Iowa,” 192.
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Service study in 1997 estimated that erosion from ephemeral gullies ranged 3.01
tons/hectare/year (in Michigan) to 31.62 tons/hectare/year (in Virginia),
concluding that if erosion from gullies were included, USLE soil loss estimates would
be doubled.150 Another study in 2008 reported that ephemeral gullies cause a loss of
5.51 to 12.13 tons/hectare/year that remains unaccounted for in our soil erosion
models.151 Farmers are well aware of gullies on their land and many routinely
smooth them over or fill them in with additional soil. But this practice only supplies
more soil to be washed away in the same way as before. In fact, soil erosion from
these the gullies actually worsen over time as they are repeatedly eroded and
smoothed over.152 What is needed is not smoothing the gullies over so that the area
can continue to be planted, but instead to plant the area that forms ephemeral
gullies into a grass waterway. The NRCS defines grass waterways as, “constructed
graded channels that are seeded to grass or other suitable vegetation. The
vegetation slows the water and the grassed waterway conveys the water to a stable
outlet at a non-erosive velocity.”153 The complication here is that grass waterways
make farming more technical and tedious, and come with the opportunity costs of
forgone crops. There is ongoing research and development into improving soil
erosion models in order to account for gullies, such the study published by in 2014
by Vieira et al.,154 and the 2016 study by Wells and Cruse et al.,155 but it will likely be
some time before ephemeral gullies are included into mainstream soil erosion
models.
In his meta-analysis on soil formation rates and soil erosion rates,
Montgomery finds that conventional agricultural erosion rates have a median of
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roughly 18 tons/hectares/year and a mean of roughly 47 tons/hectares/year
(assuming a soil bulk density of 1.2 g/cm3). That mean value tends to mirror his
values for the geological erosion rates of alpine terrain, not that of the ‘cratons’ or
the ‘soil-mantled’ terrain on which agriculture is actually practiced. However, due to
the tremendous range of environments used in the various studies he draws from,
the most reliable data in terms of assessing agriculture’s impact on erosion comes
from studies which use the same (or comparable) land and observe its erosion
under native vegetation and ‘conventional’ (with tilling) agriculture. From these
specific studies, Montgomery finds median and mean values of 18 and 124-fold
increase in erosion due to (mostly) conventional agriculture.156
1.5

Ways for Farmers to Reduce Soil Erosion Rates
The goal of agricultural conservation policy should be to ensure that farming

practices are ecologically sustainable. Practically, this means ensuring that the
present market forces make farmers weigh and consider the ecological costs of
farming. The fact that farmers discount the long run ecological costs of farming is
nothing unique to agriculture; there is tendency for both farmers and other
individuals and firms in every industry to discount costs in the distant future.
Further, the unsustainability of modern soil erosion rates in agriculture isn’t
particularly unique in the ancient and ongoing history of exhausted agricultures.
Focusing a conservation policy around a soil erosion tax is advantageous
because it directly confronts the issue. Soil erosion is negatively associated with a
wide array of conservation practices. There are numerous conservation practices
that farmers might implement, but many do not implement every available one due
to economic and technical considerations. A soil erosion tax would incentivize all
necessary conservation practices in the interest of avoiding higher tax cost.
One category of conservation farming practices is the planting of
conservation buffers. Conservation buffers are areas of land in constant vegetation
that works to filter runoff and prevent erosion. These vegetative buffers, usually
156
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some planted grass or alfalfa (which is technically not a grass, but is in the Fabaceae
family) stop and slow the movement of sediment downhill and filter out chemicals
from fertilizers and pesticides before draining into watersheds. Contour strips are
strips of grass or cover crops planted across the middle of slopped fields, slowing
sheet erosion as the soil moves downhill.157 Grass waterways are planted grass
strips in the lower crevasses of fields where ephemeral gullies would typically form.
Filter strips are grassed margins along the edge cultivated fields and watersheds,
and riparian buffers are similar to filter strips but utilize forest cover and trees in
addition to grass or cover crops. Conservation buffers have the potential to prevent
more than 50% of the loss of nutrients and pesticides, more than 60% of the loss of
certain fertilizer pathogens, and up to 75% of sediment loss.158
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Contour Strips

Other Conservation Buffers

159

Cover crops are planted grasses, legumes, and forbs for the purpose of
seasonal cover to reduce erosion by wind and water, increasing SOM, recycling and
redistributing soil nutrients, weed suppression, and reducing soil compaction.160
Fall cover crops are an especially important conservation practice. Without fall
cover crops, the soil lays bare during in the late fall after harvest and early spring
before planting, meaning that the soil is especially susceptible to erosion. More than
50% of annual soil erosion in many temperate areas occurs when frozen soils are
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thawing.161 It is critical to use cover crops to prevent erosion losses in during this
thawing period. The use of fall cover crops and cover crops planted in strips in
conjunction with the cash crop throughout the rest of the growing season also helps
aeration of the soil, lowering soil compaction and allowing for greater moisture
absorption during wet periods, and better moisture retention during dry periods.
But perhaps the greatest benefit of using cover crops is their preservation of
nitrates. Cover crops pull up nitrates from the soil and store them, preventing the
common problem of nitrate leaching that occurs when nitrogen fertilizers wash
away and/or leach through the soil, eventually ending up in waterways. Cover crops
can store excess nitrogen until they die and begin to mineralize. The decomposing
biomass provides the cash crop with additional Nitrogen throughout the growing
season.162
Conservation practices are implemented to their current extent because
there are significant economic advantages that accompany ecological stewardship.
Over the decades, the use of conservation practices has significantly improved
erosion rates [See figure: Soil Erosion Rates from ’82-‘07]. However conservation
practices are not always implemented and maintained as often as they should. It
requires a significant amount of design, engineering, and labor to implement perfect
contour strips and grass waterways so that every necessary area of a field is
grassed. Also, planting areas of grass instead of crops in the middle of a cultivated
field is an opportunity cost. The government program Environmental Quality
Incentives Program (EQIP) provides financial incentivizes for the planting of such
conservation buffers in order to reduce the costs.163 But funding for EQIP and other
similar programs is generally insufficient.164 Further explanation on EQIP and
current conservation policies are provided in section two.
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Soil Erosion Rates from ’82-‘07165

The significantly improved erosion rates under no-till farming is a silver
lining in the results of Montgomery’s meta-analysis of soil erosion and formation
rates. No-till involves leaving the soil structure intact (not tilling it) and letting the
crop residue that remains after harvest lay on the surface rather than incorporating
it. No-till has become increasingly popular over the past decades due primarily to
the increased yields and productivity that results from healthier soil.166 No-till was
relatively new on the scene in the 1970s, but in 2000, 16% of US cropland was no-
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till.167 Globally No-till has grown from about 45 million hectares in 1999, then 72
million ha in 2003, and 111 million ha in 2009.168 There is no singular or precise
definition for no-till farming, because many farmers who claim to practice ‘no-till’ in
fact practice rotational tillage, perhaps tilling once every four years, once every
other year, or even once a year at the end of the growing season. The soil should
remain permanently layered with crop residues from previous cash crops or cover
crops, but the amount of residue that is kept as litter also varies greatly across notill farms. Crop rotation is also supposed to be a fundamental element of no-till
farming but the degree to which no-till farmers rotate cover crops and which crops
are rotated also varies greatly. In order to practice no-till, specialized equipment is
necessary for penetrating the crop litter during seeding, as well as extra pesticides
for weed and pest management (weeds are normally killed by tilling). Under all
these requirements (tilling less than annually, utilizing a permanent residue layer,
and regularly rotating cash crops with cover crops) no-till farming is considered the
epitome of the widely used concept of ‘Conservation Agriculture’.169 Although the US
has always been the leading country for adopting no-till (approximately 25% of US
land under cultivation is no-till, self defined), of the 25.3 million hectares of no-till
cultivated land in the US in 2004, only about 10 to 12 percent is permanently under
this system and less than half of land under ‘no-till’ would qualify under the stricter
definition of Conservation Agriculture. The reasons for this are practical and
economical; with the help of US farm policy and the subsidy farm support system, it
is more profitable to practice monoculture year after year on the same field than to
practice careful crop rotations. Also, it is less technically complicated and laborious
to farm with conventional practices and tillage.170
Montgomery’s meta-analysis finds overwhelmingly that no-till, which is often
practiced in tandem with other conservation practices, is positively associated with
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lower rates of soil erosion. This is primarily because the surface layer of crop litter
acts as a mulch increasing water retention and reducing runoff and erosion.171 From
the 47 studies that Montgomery analyzed that included land being cultivated by
‘conservation agriculture’, no-till farming resulted in .082 and .084 mm/year
median and mean values of soil erosion (compared to the 1.537 and 3.939 mm/year
median and mean values of soil erosion raters under conventional agriculture).172
One of the first trials of no-till in the 1970s reported a 75% reduction in soil erosion
from Indiana cornfields.173 A 1986 study showed that no-till farming reduced soil
erosion by >90% over conventional tobacco cultivation.174 A 1993 study in
Kentucky amazingly found that no-till methods decreased soil erosion 98%175
Studies continue to show the yield increases and productivity benefits that
accompany no-till. One recently published study compared fields under no-till and
cover crops, to land cultivated with traditional tilling practices, and found that
conservation agriculture improved yields 15% due to preserved microbial
communities that better cycled carbon, nitrogen, and phosphorus – critical nutrients
in soil.176
Montgomery’s results showed that no-till farming lowered soil erosion rates
to roughly that of the geological erosion rate, suggesting that under no-till, soil
erosion is nearly a null issue. Although no-till and conservation agriculture can
significantly improve our soil erosion and soil formation rates, two problems
remain: coercing all farmers into implementing conservation agriculture, and the
fact that unaccounted for ephemeral gulley erosion remains severe, even on fields
with carefully implemented no-till. The studies that Montgomery compiled used
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traditional soil erosion models that systematically underestimate the real amount of
erosion because they do not account for ephemeral gullies and the volatile nature of
soil erosion during storms. Improving soil erosion models to account for ephemeral
gullies and sever weather patterns is the ongoing work of Richard Cruse and other
researchers Iowa State.177 Even if every hectare of cultivated land were managed
with no-till, we would not have yet solved the problem of soil erosion entirely.
Perhaps more importantly, policy makers have remained unsuccessful in fostering
market conditions that incentivize the widespread adoption of conservation
practices. Even though no-till and conservation agricultural is not a cure-all for soil
erosion and degradation, the implementation of these practices must be widespread
and nearly universal across US farms. A soil erosion tax would quickly incentive the
widespread adoption of these already existing conservation practices.
In summary, agriculture is the very foundation of civilization and its practice
has always been somewhat precarious. If modern civilization is to continue to
flourish over the decades and centuries to come, it’s absolutely essential that we
operate with sustainable rates of soil erosion and formation. In order to achieve this
goal, we must improve soil erosion models so that conservation practices are driven
by a more precise understanding of the economic costs that result from farming
practices, as well as the costs associated with the absence of conservation practices.
One central question to conservation agriculture, what is the economic cost in lost
yield due to soil erosion, remains almost completely ambiguous. This question is
exactly what Rick Cruse aims to answer in his ongoing research grant from the
Leopold Center. Gaining a better understanding of the exact economic costs at hand
with soil erosion provides policy makers even more justification for the imposition
of Pigouvian tax strategy in order to internalize the externalities of soil erosion,
which will in turn incentivize farmers into implementing the many specific
agronomic practices that improve the sustainability of soil erosion/formation.
Indeed many of these conservation techniques are currently practiced, but they
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remain sparsely adopted. The goal of agricultural policy should be to ensure that the
practices proven to improve soil conservation are universally adopted.
Section 2: Modern US Farm Policy
2.1

Brief History of the Farm Bill
Just as lessons were learned from the dust bowl that justify the

implementation of a soil erosion tax, the history of US farm policy since the dust
bowl reinforces the need to break from the mold of failed conservation policies.
Also, a brief examination of the progression of agricultural policy and successive
farm bill illustrates the purpose, necessity, and complexity of the expensive and
expansive US agricultural policy system as a whole. In order to prescribe policy
solutions for the present and future, it’s fundamental to first understand the past.
Modern American agricultural policy began in the 1930s as an attempt to
address a crisis of overproduction. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration
managed to mostly salvage an oversaturated industry and was committed to the
well-being of each individual farmer in the face of market forces that would have led
to the bankruptcy of many. In the decades that followed agricultural policy evolved
through various farm bill legislations. Though the specific policies have changed
significantly over the decades, each farm bill has continued to provide a price floor
and income support for farmer, and to find new and creative ways for increasing the
demand for agricultural goods. Instead of the bankruptcy that seemed imminent due
to market forces, most farmers left agriculture by their own will over the last eight
decades of farm policy. There were roughly six million farms in 1930, while today
there are around 2 million, a number that has remained relatively constant since
1990.178 Although soil conservation has played a role throughout modern US
agricultural policy, its role has always been secondary to more urgent economic
concerns. The following is a brief history of the farm bill since the 1930s. The
security of farm income and the stimulation of demand have always been the
Dimitri et al., “The 20th Century Transformation of U.S. Agriculture and Farm Policy,” Economic
Information Bulletin Number 3 of the Economic Research Service (2005), 5
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primary goals of US agricultural policy – immediate economic security first, long run
ecological considerations second.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his administration entered Washington in
1933 with more political capital than any new president in US history. Congress and
the executive branch were both prepared to try anything in order to combat the
Great Depression. One such ad hoc policy was the Agricultural Adjustment Act
(AAA) – the beginning of a long tradition of farm bills - signed into law on May 12,
1933. As mentioned before in the discussion of the dust bowl, American agriculture
was in a crisis of overproduction, a massive supply glut. The price of agricultural
commodities had fallen too low to keep individual farmers above the costs of
operating the farm. The AAA aimed to revitalize the revenue of farmers to what it
had been in the Golden Age of American Agriculture (1909-1914). It established the
baseline (parity) of optimal farm-household purchasing power179, using the average
costs of production and farm revenue during that period of farm prosperity. Policy
makers of the 1930s aimed to supplement farmer’s income in order to restore their
purchasing power to parity. The AAA authorized the USDA to offer direct payments
to farmers in exchange for participation in acreage control programs for ‘basic
crops’. This way, they could pump revenue to farmers while also decreasing the
amount each farmer planted. The law established taxes on food processors, and
used that tax revenue to fund the direct payments and acreage control programs, as
well as other policies of the AAA.
Although the AAA could limit acreage in the future, it needed to address the
issue of oversupply for the crops already planted in 1933. Non-recourse loans,
provided by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) were initiated as temporary
emergency measures, until the production control policies fixed the market in the
long run. These loans effectively set price floors for given commodities, as the
government became a guaranteed buyer at that rate. The first cotton loan level in
1933 was set at 69 percent parity, corn at 60 percent parity180, meaning that the
Purchasing power being defined as the ability for farmers’ average revenue to adequately cover
the average costs of operation.
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price at which the government would buy corn would be the estimated price for
providing farmers with 60 percent of the full purchasing power of the average
farmer between 1909 – 1914.
As mentioned in Part A, Section 3, in 1936 the Supreme Court case Butler v.
United States ruled the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1993 unconstitutional. The
direct payments by the federal government to individual farmers for production
control provisions - funded by the tax on food processors - was ruled an
overextension of the federal government’s power versus that of individual states.
The reason for the ruling was the use of the specific tax on food processors. Despite
being unconstitutional; the AAA had been successful in pumping revenue into the
rural economy; farm income in 1935 had risen 50 percent since 1932, largely
because of the AAA.181
Needing an alternative method for coordinating the limit of agricultural
production, in 1936 congress passed the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment
Act and established Hugh Hammond Bennett’s Soil Conservation Service. The Soil
Conservation Service (SCS) was established as a permanent agency. The SCS’s
primary policy tool was the Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP), which was
the original land retirement program and would serve as a precursor for similar
land-retirement programs, as well as other conservation programs to come. The
ACP could restrict the still imminent over-production by paying farmers for shifting
acreage from ‘soil depleting crops’, such as cotton or corn, to ‘soil enriching crops’,
such as alfalfa, peanuts, etc. That year, the incentives for soil conservation alone
proved inadequate for widespread crop reduction. A drought in ’36 kept prices high,
and obscured the failure of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act to
incentivize farmers into planting less and conserving soil resources. However,
commodity surpluses and falling prices the following year in 1937 made it clear that
the ACP, alone, was ineffective for the reduction of agricultural production.182 From
the beginning, soil conservation policies were about making the long run
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sustainable behavior economical for farmers, but just like the conservation policies
that would follow, it failed to draw enough excitement and political support from
farm communities.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 aimed to reestablish the control lost
by the USDA with the ruling of Butler v. United States. Explicitly defending its
congressional authority to govern matters of interstate commerce, the AAA of 1938
drew its funds from the general tax pool. The AAA of 1938 was essentially the same
as the AAA of 1933, only slightly more assertive, mandating (versus providing the
option for) the USDA to provide non-recourse loan price supports for wheat, corn,
and cotton, and at the option of the Secretary of Agriculture for many other crops.
Marketing quotas were established (pending a referendum by all of the farmers of
that commodity on whether to participate as a whole) for corn, cotton, rice, wheat,
and tobacco. Farmers who remained under their allocated marketing quotas
received tax exemptions, while those who exceeded their marketing quotas received
no tax exemptions. The need for these market quotas was illustrated in 1939, when
tobacco growers voted against the quota in their referendum; the resulting
overproduction was disastrous to the industry and the marketing quota was voted
back into effect the next year. The AAA established the rates of loans for specific
commodities usually between 50 and 75 percent of parity, but at the Secretary of
Agriculture’s discretion. The 1938 AAA also established the first government crop
insurance program183 and established country soil conservation districts.184
WWII provided an enormous economic stimulus for the American economy,
mostly through profits from defense contracts. In 1941, congress aimed to provide
the benefits of the military industrial complex to farmers. CCC loan rates were
raised to 85 percent parity until 1946 for all normally supported ‘basic’
commodities and also ‘non-basic’ farm commodities that the Secretary of
Agriculture saw fit to support so as to increase wartime production. In 1942, new
amendments and legislation continued to raise CCC loan rates up to 90 percent
Rasmussen et al., “A Short History of Agricultural Adjustment, 1933-75,” 6.
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parity for basic and non-basic commodities. In 1944 and 1945 the CCC purchased
cotton at 100 percent parity.185 The use of incredibly high farm subsidies
throughout WWII was touted as a way of increasing the income of family farms but
it was also a way for the military to secure food for troops. With very high nonrecourse loan rates, more farmers forfeited their grains and kept their loan rates.
This kept the government storage bins full and soldiers fed.
Until WWII, stockpiles in government granaries continued to rise along with
concern about the excess storage. However, the excess stock proved valuable with
the onset of World War II. Rather than the criticism of excess storage that was
common in the thirties and early forties, post-war convention held that the
government granaries should always be stocked to meet wartime levels. WWII let
America forget that farmers still produced more than what was demanded due to
the price floor. The AAA of 1933 and the following agricultural policies worked in
the short run to keep farms financial afloat, but did not fix the underlying and long
run factor of too many farmers needing to produce too much in order to cover the
costs of operation.
Phasing out farm-support spending has been ever-present challenge of policy
makers since the beginning of modern farm support – a challenge that has never
been overcome entirely. Wartime price supports were set to expire at the end of
1948 and would’ve reverted to the 50 – 75 percent range mandated by the 1938
AAA. Afraid of what abruptly lowering the price floor would do to farmers who
depended on price supports, Congress hoped to ease the transition away from such
high price floors. The Agricultural Act of 1948 maintained mandatory CCC loan rates
for a variety of crops at 90 percent parity for the year of 1949. Another legislation
the following year updated the loan rates so that basic crops received 90 percent
parity payments in 1950, between 90 and 80 percent in 1951, then levels varying
from 75 to 90 percent in 1952 and onward. However, the breakout of the Korean
War prevented this transition to lower supports from occurring. The Secretary of
Agriculture used the national security clause to maintain payments at 90 percent
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parity for every basic commodity except peanuts. Acreage allotment programs were
also ignored in 1951 and 1952 for wheat, corn, cotton, and rice. Following the end of
the Korean War in 1953, debate ensued whether to keep prices fixed high, or
flexible over a range of parity rates. The Agricultural Act of 1954 established a
flexible scale of price supports at 75 to 90 percent parity following 1955 indefinitely
for all basic crops (except tobacco which was mandated at 90 percent parity). 186
Without the outlet for surplus stores provided by feeding troops in WWII and
then the Korean War, farm policy needed a new way to dispose of surpluses gained
from the utilization of the price floor. In 1954 Congress also passed the Agricultural
Trade and Assistance Act (commonly referred to as Public Law 480 or P.L. 480) that
established the Food For Peace program. Under the pretense of humanitarian aid,
P.L. 480 allowed ‘friendly’ countries to purchase US farm commodities with local
currency. The clause for only ‘friendly’ nations was discourage poor countries from
associating with communism and the Soviet Bloc, and the use of nation’s local
currency allowed them to save on foreign exchange reserves making the purchase
dramatically cheaper. The prices provided by the US government were much
cheaper than what local producers could offer, as well as other agricultural
producing and exporting nations (Canada, Australia, Argentina and New Zealand).
Like any trade dumping, the Food for Peace program was to the advantage of the US
agricultural industry, and to the advantage of consumers in the nations that the
goods were imported, but to the disadvantage of any domestic farmer or other
international agricultural producer also supplying within that market. Since the
1950s, despite externalities to local farmers, the Food for Peace and food aid
programs that evolved from it has been critical tools for increase of US supplied
markets and the removal of surplus commodities.187
For the last two decades, following the failure of the 1936 Soil and
Conservation act to adequately limit production, agricultural policies had focused on
price supports rather than production limits. Farmers were happy to receive a boost
Rasmussen et al., “A Short History of Agricultural Adjustment, 1933-75,” 10.
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of income support in order to escape the Great Depression and the increased
wartime demand in the 1940s and 50s made high price floors feasible. However, the
Agricultural Act of 1956 represented a movement back towards focusing on limiting
acreage with the establishment of the Soil Bank. The Soil Bank program provided
paid contracts to farmers who agreed to plant less than the allotment for crops with
acreage allotments already established (wheat, cotton, corn, tobacco, peanuts and
rice) and also provided paid contracts for farmers who simply put land to
conservation reserve for a designated period of up to ten years. For the first time
since 1936, federal farm policy spurred a significant movement towards soil and
resource conservation. In fact, the conservation reserves were occasionally so
popular that it caused severe complications in some rural communities where
farmers put all of their land into conservation.188 A local farm economy with all of
the land in conservation is poor business for mechanics, truck drivers, seasonal
harvest workers, and other agricultural service sectors.
Farm policy continued to evolve in the 60’s in order to keep up with the
improving efficiency of agricultural production. The trends in farm policy were
toward more conservation, in order to limit production, and finding new outlets for
surplus stores. The Feed Grain Act of 1961 reestablished CCC loan rates at not less
than 65 percent parity (the effective rate became 74 percent) and incentivized
acreage conservation by providing price support for corn and grain producers only
after retiring at least 20 percent of the land used for these crops during the previous
two years. The Agricultural Act of 1961 and following legislation of the ‘60s
continued to incentivize increased acreage conservation. The increased
conservation was an economic strategy more than an ecological consideration;
increasing yields and growing government granary stocks called for action against
overproduction. The growing government stocks began to be used for social
welfare, first with the use of a pilot food stamp program under Kennedy, and then
it’s full implantation under Johnson. Throughout the decade, government reserves
from the utilization of the CCC loan rate (price floor) were increasingly spent
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towards resource allotment to school lunch programs and international distribution
of American produce abundance. Also, exports under P.L. 480 increased 40 % under
the Kennedy Administration. 189
When the US withdrew from the Breton Woods Agreement (a system for
exchange rate management established by the UN following WWII) over 1971 and
1973, because of running a persistent gold exchange deficit, the US dollar declined
in foreign exchange value. When the US dollar declined in value, US agricultural
commodities became more competitive in international markets. Exports boomed
and commodity prices continued to rise. This, along with general inflation, the OPEC
oil embargo, and the popular belief of declining natural resources, resulted the
doubling of farmland prices between 1972 and 1979. The high land prices lead to
the most intense period of rural investment (farm machinery, buildings and rural
housing) since the Golden Age of Agriculture before WWI.190
With a dollar favoring US exports and a massive purchase of US wheat by the
Russian Government. The USDA asked farmers to plant fencerow to fencerow in
order to answer the call of markets. Farmers eagerly removed land from the
conservation programs that had been established by the Soil Bank since the ‘50s.
The 1970s showed how difficult it can be to maintain conservation retirement
programs over the long run, especially once they are no longer economical in the
short run.191
Although the devaluation of the dollar increased US exports for a short while,
the dollar soon appreciated and exports shrank. Prices for farm commodities
dropped and by the mid 80’s land prices had dropped 30 to 50 percent. Soon
deficiency payments and nonrecourse loans were heavily utilized and the
government took entitlement to hundreds of millions of bushels of grain.192

Rasmussen et al., “A Short History of Agricultural Adjustment, 1933-75,” 14.
Edward Lotterman, “Farm Bills and Farmers: The effects of subsidies over time,” Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis: The Region, (December 1996).
191 O.C. Doering, “An overview of conservation and agricultural policy: Questions from the past and
observations about the present,” Agriculture and Conservation Policies, A Workshop in Honor of
Norman A. Berg (1997).
192 Lotterman, “Farm Bills and Farmers: The effects of subsidies over time.”
189
190

71

Due to growing discontent with the costs of agricultural policy, and also
concern over the ecological imbalance of the US agricultural market, there was
significant political momentum for policy reform in the 1980s. In 1985, State
Representative Richard Gephardt of Missouri, and Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa,
drafted a farm bill that would have set a strict supply control system. Farmers would
have been allotted quotas for production and sales. Any amount over the quota
would be illegal for sale. This would’ve streamlined an increasingly complex farm
support and production allotment system and greatly reduced costs to the treasury,
but also would have increased food prices for consumers. It was never voted in
largely because of skepticism about the practicality of a strict supply control system
for commodities with such vast quantities and range of international markets.193
The 1885 farm bill that did become implemented represented a desperate
attempt to regain lost export markets. The downturn in exports was blamed on too
high of loan rates that created all around high prices for US agricultural
commodities. Congress hoped that by reducing price supports and providing export
subsidies, they could reclaim international markets. Policy makers failed to
recognize that the trend towards lost exports was partially the result of
independently rising agriculturally exporting nations who were now benefiting
from the technological improvements on acreage efficiency that US farming had
been reaping for half a century. US farmers were simply not as price competitive
against international competition and the export subsidies required to make their
commodities price competitive were immense. The price of farm commodities in the
US that was necessary to assure that farmers covered their running costs was
simply higher than what was required to sustain farmers revenue and cover input
costs required in poorer countries with weaker currency.194
The 1985 farm bill was also the first to have a separate title in the bill for
conservation; it represented a significant shift towards conservation, rather than
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just acreage allotments and supply control. New programs were added such as the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), which incentivized the retirement of
farmland on contracts, just like the Soil Bank did in the 1950s, and the ACP of the
1930s. But most significantly, the 1985 farm bill set up a Conservation Compliance
program in order to coerce farmers into using conservation practices and lowering
their rates of soil erosion. Conservation compliance meant that farmers on ‘highly
erodible land’ were required to develop and implement a ‘farm conservation plan’
by 1995. The failure to comply would result in the extreme penalty of lost eligibility
for all farm program benefits (price-support programs, CCC loans, government crop
insurance, and even CRP payments). The initial enforcement of conservation
compliance caused political uproar in rural communities where the soil
conservation service were declaimed, ‘soil cops’. However, due to the vagueness of
the law that mandating the establishment of some ‘conservation plan’, it was never
clear exactly where to draw the line against non-compliant farmers, especially when
the penalty was so high for farmers.195 From its creation in 1985 to its effective
removal in 1996, the conservation compliance program was unpopular and rarely
enforced.
Farm policy remained relatively the same throughout the late 80’s and early
90’s (other than the Soil Conservation Service being renamed the National
Resources Conservation Service, in 1994)196 until the Federal Agricultural
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (FAIR) under the Clinton Administration. The
1996 farm bill, euphemized the Freedom to Farm Act, was the result of a fiscally
conservative Congress that aimed to wean farmers off of government price
supports. This was acceptable for the agribusinesses lobby only if the new
legislation removed restrictive conservation programs, like the conservation
compliance program from 1985. Farm policy was seen as a retardant to the growth
of the agricultural sector (as if that wasn’t the point – the reason farm policy was
always seen necessary was to keep an industry that systemically produced too much
T.L. Napier, ed., Implementing the Conservation Title of the Food Security Act of 1985, Soil and
Water Conservation Society (1990).
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financially afloat). Congress was eager to cut budget costs, and the Clinton
Administration hoped to foster a new era of US agriculture that was more kosher to
the demands of the WTO (newly established in 1995) and global trade policy. Also,
policy makers were optimistic that the projections for rising demands in China
would make unregulated agricultural exports feasible.197
The 1996 farm bill was a seven-year program for dismantling the longstanding price support system for farm commodities. The transition towards no
government price supports was to be eased by a series of direct cash payments,
related to farmers previous years of production. These cash payments would slowly
decrease over the seven-year span. Direct payments were ‘decoupled’, meaning the
crops concerned, their prices and levels of production would be irrelevant. Their
implementation has (in theory) no distortion of farmer’s decisions on which
commodities to produce. A corn subsidy, for example, is coupled because it
incentivizes farmers to grow corn. An automatic direct payment, given regardless of
prices or production decisions, is decoupled because farmers producing behavior
remains unaffected. Decoupled farm support is the only agricultural protectionism
fully endorsed by the WTO. The 1996 Farm bill also eliminated annual acreage
control programs and most public stocks that were associated with CCC loans. The
USDA would no longer place limits on farmer’s production – thus the ‘Freedom to
Farm Act’. Also, failure to meet Conservation Compliance would no longer result in
any penalty. 198
Farmers and policy makers were optimistic that the necessary changes
toward equilibrium could occur painlessly through the action of the farmers alone. If
prices dropped, individual farmers would understand that they should plant less of
that crop and perhaps more of some other crop with higher demand. The freemarket would supposedly balance itself and at the liberation of taxpayer budget.
However things did not go as planned. 1995 had been a shortfall in corn production
so things went on as normal. Levels rose in 1996 and by 1998, a good crop year (but
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not a record year) made for a glut and prices fell. Corn farmers were running
operations in the red. The government, that had only two years ago proclaimed the
farm bill to end all farm bills, sprang into action for emergency relief. Huge
emergency payments and loan deficiency payments were provided over the next
four years. The 1996 farm bill had failed. Farmers proved too unorganized to
painlessly transition towards market equilibrium. As soon as the ‘natural’ process of
eliminating suppliers in an oversaturated market began, the government reassumed
the role as the crutch for a systemically unsustainable agricultural industry. 199
The 2002 farm bill was not a complete relapse to old policies. Congressmen
Ron Kind of Wisconsin and a coalition of representatives (many of them from farm
states) sponsored an amendment to the proposed bill that would have shifted
billions of dollars from the commodity specific programs to conservation programs.
The amendment failed by a slim margin and the 2002 farm bill became another
installment of classical US farm support. The Secretary of Agriculture, Ann Veneman
was not a supporter of the final 2002 bill. She was openly critical of traditional farm
support programs and hopped to transition support towards conservation rather
than subsidies. Conservation would address the issue of overproduction, lower
commodity prices and utilized government support. Although there were also
significant efforts by congresspersons to address the systemic issues of
overproduction, reform proved futile and subsidies reigned over the bill. 17 billion
dollars was allotted to conservation programs, while the commodity subsidy
programs were expected to cost 190 billion over the next 10 years.200
The 2002 farm bill was in many was a relapse into the traditional price and
income support policies. The support shown for the Kind amendment, however,
provided optimism to those looking for reform, and various interest groups began to
set their eyes on the incoming farm bill, which would eventually be passed in 2008.
Although the 1996 Freedom to Farm Act was largely a failure, fiscal conservatives
still wanted nothing to with farm subsidies, which they saw as the paradigm of
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wasteful big government. Environmentalists wanted greater emphasis on
conservation, protection of watersheds and regulation of environmentally
destructive farm practices. Anti-hunger activists wanted greater focus on the food
stamps and foreign aid programs. Global justice activists wanted the removal of
‘trade distorting subsidies’ that maintained surplus domestic production and the
subsequent fall of global prices, benefiting wealthy US farmers at the expense of
poor farmers in developing nations. Urban and corporate America wanted a globally
friendly direction for US agricultural policy that could move negotiations forward at
the Doha round of global trade talks and pave the way for profitable global trade
agreements, opening access to new markets. By 2005, a hodgepodge of 35 different
organizations, from the politically far right to the far left, loosely affiliated by a
commitment to agricultural policy reform, called themselves the Alliance for
Sensible Agricultural Policy (ASAP).201 Although the various organizations of the
ASAP disagreed on exactly how US farm policy should change, their mutual goals
were threefold: “to pare back government payments seen as duplicative, wasteful,
and tilted toward the wealthiest farmers; to phase out subsidies seen as propping
up rich farmers at the expense of unsubsidized farmers in developing countries; and
to use the savings either to reduce the federal deficit or to boost financing for
nutrition, rural development, conservation, and renewable energy.”202
Commodity programs were targeted as the main culprit of globally trade
distorting and domestically wasteful farm support. Because the commodity
programs support the price of commodity, quantity matters, and very large farmers
sometimes reap in very large amounts of government payments. The inclusion of
large farmers into the public safety net made more sense when agricultural policy
implemented acreage control programs that those receiving price and income
supports had to comply with. This was done in order to scale back production and
raise prices. An acreage control program would have been senseless without
including the largest farmers. But such programs ended with the 1996 farm bill, and
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so the exclusion of the largest and wealthiest farmers from government support was
now a real possibility.203
Another major goal of the reform movement was also to end the duplicity of
safety nets and provide a single payer system of government farm support.
Currently, the farm bill provided two safety nets: one, a vast network of public
support programs, the other, a semiprivate subsidized crop insurance safety net. In
2006, the American Farmland Trust (AFT) endorsed the ideas of Carl Zulauf,
professor of agriculture at Ohio State University. Zulauf argued that the most glaring
flaw in farm policy was the dual safety net, and that its merger would save
taxpayer’s money and provide a real safety net.204 The Iowa Corn Growers
Association made a similar endorsement towards a single payer system, and
provided the blue prints – through the work of Iowa State University economist,
Bruce Babcock – for the Average Crop Revenue (ACR) plan. The ACR would become
government provided revenue insurance. If chosen, farmers would forfeit any
entitlement to countercyclical payments and a portion of direct payments but would
secure their end of the year revenue, which would be calculated by how much and
what each individual planted. 205
The political pressure for agricultural reform was higher than ever before,
but the 2006 congressional election would change the landscape in Washington
unexpectedly. The Democratic Party won a sweeping victory over both houses of
Congress in 2006. In the Senate, the Democrats won six new seats, and in the House,
31 new seats, and without a single incumbent loosing their district. Nancy Pelosi
became the first-ever female Speaker of the House. Nineteen of the party’s victories
came from rural states that had voted for Bush. The Democratic Party Leadership
had a new agenda for agricultural policy in order to consolidate their new hold.
They placed eight freshman House Representatives on the Agricultural Committee,
putting them in a position to take credit for a 2008 farm bill that brought big
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dividends to the rural community. In an interview with Dan Morgan, House Majority
Leader Steny Hoyer of Maryland explained the predicament, “It is a real challenge,
because we want to make some changes [in farm policy] but we don’t want to put
our members at risk.” Politicians don’t win elections by being fiscally responsible on
a national level, they win elections by serving the interests of their constituents, and
that’s exactly what these new ‘Agricrats’ did.206
After a long and embittered political process (multiple failed drafts and
amendments through the House, significant revisions in the Senate, a veto by
president Bush, and the final override in the House, made possible by rampant pork
barreling) the $307 billion 2008 farm bill was passed. For better or worse,
significant reform didn’t happen – the bill largely resembled the 2002 farm bill,
except that it had added on an additional $10 to $20 billion in order to appease a
much wider span of interest groups that at one point had stood for reform.207 The
ACR program was implemented, under the name Average Crop Revenue Election
(ACRE) but in a watered-down version. Lobbing efforts by the crop insurance
proved effective and the ACR as originally envisioned was tweaked so as not to
encroach on the private sector. The Corn Growers Association Ron Litterer claimed
this tweak robbed the ACR of providing any meaningful reform.208
President Bush’s veto message provides an adequate critique of the 2008
farm bill: “At a time of high food prices and record farm income, this bill lacks
program reform and fiscal discipline. It continues subsidies for the wealthy and
increases farm bill spending by more than $20 billion, while using budget gimmicks
to hide much of the increase. It is inconsistent with our objectives in international
trade negotiations.” The president also said it was “irresponsible to increase
government subsidy rates for 15 crops, subsidize additional crops, and provide
payments that further distort markets.” The Bush administration also criticized the
implementation of ACRE, which created yet another farm bureaucracy and provided
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a new and ‘uncapped’ revenue guarantee.209 The 2008 farm bill was another blow to
those pushing away from government support.
The 2014 farm bill became dangerously closed to not being passed, but after
an emotional plea and some careful political maneuvering by Rep. Frank Lucas,
chairman of the agricultural committee, a farm bill was finally agreed upon by
Congress and signed by President Obama in Feb 2014. 210 The most significant
change in the 2014 Agricultural Act was the elimination of 40.85 billion dollars in
direct payments (this removed nearly all direct payments, except for certain direct
payments to cotton growers which were phased out over the next two years).211 In
place of the direct payments, there’s increased protection against declining revenue
through the ACRE program and other insurance programs. The projected 10-year
costs are around one trillion dollars,212 but relative to continued expenditure of
programs from the 2008 bill, it saved 16.5 billion over the 10-year period.213 Instead
of addressing low prices with targets fixed by Congress, the 2014 farm bill focuses
on programs that address revenue loss. Subsidized crop insurance is now a
foundation of the US farm safety net, along with Title I, standard farm commodity
programs. 214
Title II, the conservation title, changed in some significant ways. Twelve
programs were repealed and their roles consolidated into others programs so that
there are now four main approaches to conservation policy in the farm bill: 1) land
retirement (Conservation Reserve Program [CRP]), 2) enhanced conservation
practices on agricultural land (Environmental Quality Incentives Program [EQIP]
and Conservation Stewardship Program [CSP]), 3) Government purchase of
easements for preserving natural resources and ecosystems on private land
(Agricultural Conservation Easement Program), 4) fostering local partnerships to
address site specific environmental issues (the Regional Conservation Partnership
Morgan, “Farm Bill and Beyond,” 51.
“Passing The Agricultural Act Of 2014 | Congressman Frank Lucas,” 2015Accessed August 31
2015. Lucas.house.gov
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Program [RCPP]). Funding was cut from the CRP by $ 3 billion and from the CSP by
$2 billion. Funding remained steady for EQIP, however it has been asked to pick up
the slack from and perform the roles of several repealed programs. EQIP is meant to
make conservation practices economically worthwhile for farmers, but there simply
isn’t enough funding to cover everyone and acceptance into the program is highly
competitive.215 CRP payments remain the most heavily funded, and in order to
qualify for subsidized crop insurance and revenue insurance, farmers cannot plow
any land with native sod.216 The consolidation of the roles of various repealed
programs into the Regional Conservation Partnership Program could prove over
time to be a significant shift in conservation policy approach, using government
money to fund various local sustainability enterprises so that regional conservation
practices are implemented at their own discretion.217
2.2

Farm Bill History in Review
Although US farm policy has always been primarily about the economic

prosperity of American farmers, conservation has remained a constant aspect of
farm policy since the 1930s, largely because of the environmental concern spurred
by the dust bowl. And throughout this long and rich history, conservation has
always fallen short of achieving anything resembling a permanent and ecologically
sustainable agriculture. This short summary recounts the role of conservation over
the last 83 years of US agricultural policy.
Political momentum for conservation was initially triggered by the dust bowl
and paved the way for Big Hugh Bennett’s 1936 Soil Conservation and Domestic
Allotment Act. From the beginning, the goal of agricultural conservation policy has
been to better represent long run economic costs associated with ecological damage
in the present decision making of farmers. The ACP helped make progress toward
“Environmental Quality Incentives Program” National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition Website,
Accessed March 13, 2016,
216 Zulauf, and Orden, The US Agricultural Act Of 2014: Overview And Analysis, 35. Native sod is so rare
that the sodbuster program doesn’t apply on a lot of land that isn’t currently under cultivation.
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this goal by providing cash incentives for alternating cash crops with soil-enriching
crops. Ecologically responsible farming became more economical for farmers. But
it’s critical to recognize that the only reason that land retirement and the ACP was
politically achievable at the time, is because it was in the short run interests of the
agricultural economy during the 1930s.
However, soil conservation alone failed to entice farmers in the same way
that the AAA had. The soil conservation districts established in 1938 were largely
ignored during WWII and the Korean War because farmers preferred to do their job
– grow crops and make money – instead of policing their neighbors.
Following the high price floors of the 1940s and early 50s, the USDA and
congressional policy makers found it difficult to lower the price support system; the
equilibrium cost of farming (land, seeds, machinery, etc.) had adjusted to account
for the new equilibrium farm income that included government supports, and now
farmers could not remain profitable without the supports. Farm policy began to look
like an endless system of ratcheting up farmers’ incomes, bit by bit, every year in
order to continuously protect farmers from the risk of bankruptcy. And along with
the escalating costs of the 1950s and ‘60s, the quantity of government owned grains
were amassing as well. During these two decades, land retirement and soil
conservation were economical for farmers in order to limit aggregate supply and
raise prices – it was for this reason alone that soil conservation found political
momentum and the Soil Bank program was established in 1956.
Since the 1960s, agricultural policy has managed to partially avoid constantly
escalationing the costs of farm support by implementing policies that increased the
demand for agricultural commodities. The Food for Peace program, and school
nutrition programs of the 1960s were examples of such policies for increasing
demand. Demand then skyrocketed during the recession of the ‘70s, when the US
export market was strong, and it again proved difficult to maintain soil conservation
and land retirement programs against opposing economic forces. However, the
strength of the US dollar recovered and in the 80s, US exports would have shrank,
except that the 1985 Food Security Act made sure to protect our export markets.

81

Again, conservation was implemented in the 1980s because farmers felt the need to
restrict aggregate production amidst falling prices.
The 1985 farm bill took an assertive step in the direction of conservation
with the use of the conservation compliance program, which mandated that farmers
create a ‘conservation plan’ on highly erodible land. Like the failure of Dr. Gray’s
plan from the 1930s for conservation compliance - a more strict system of localized
oversight than the soil conservation districts that we have today – the 1985 plan
was a federal legislation that never engendered enough local support to carry it
through into its successful implementation. For the most part, farmers hated being
told by the government how to do their job. And it must have extremely awkward
for the local SCS/NRCS agents to suddenly begin policing farmers, their peers and
fellow community members, at the threat of totally losing their farm support
package. Although conservation compliance technically remains on the books, the
1996 farm bill removed its penalty of ineligibility for the rest of farm support
payments.
Various conservation programs remain on the books today, but funding is
currently inadequate for the widespread application of programs, such as in the case
of EQIP. There remain important ecological challenges for agricultural policy to
address. What follows in this essay is normative argument for the implementation of
a soil erosion tax in order to address the fundamental ecological challenge of
agriculture.

Section 3: A Soil Erosion Tax: Traditional Approach for New Solutions
3.1

Pigouvian Taxes and Soil Erosion
British economist Arthur C. Pigou (1877-1959) was a pioneer in the field of

welfare economics. He is most famous for his development of the already existing
but primitive concept of externalities. Externalities are costs imposed or benefits
conferred on others that are not taken into account by the individual who is acting.
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Pigou argued that negative externalities (pollution for example), if significant
enough, warrant government intervention in the form of a tax that discourages that
specific practice. The tax value is supposed to represent the social cost. Likewise,
Pigou argued for government subsidies for activities with positive externalities
(education for example). Taxes and subsidies for those purposes are called
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies.218
A Standard Pigouvian Tax219

“Arthur Cecil Pigou” Library of Economics and Liberty: The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics,
website accessed March 13th, 2016, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Pigou.html
219 Image taken from the BYU Idaho Economics department website:
https://courses.byui.edu/econ_150/econ_150_old_site/lesson_11.htm
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If this diagram were a soil erosion Pigouvian tax, the commodity will be land – quantity of land on the
horizontal axis and its price on the vertical axis.
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In Pigouvian economic theory, the government must find the ‘efficient level’
for a per unit tax. For example, the efficient level of an alcohol tax would make it so
that the costs of individuals buying alcohol are equal to the normal private costs of
buying alcohol, plus the social cost of alcohol consumption, which might include the
probable damage of drunk driving or noise pollution. The socially optimal market
outcome is the result of the new market equilibrium that results after the social
costs, or externalities of this practice are imposed with a tax. The Pigouvian tax is set
so that the marginal return of the practice includes the marginal social costs220 in
other words, the return of producing or consuming one additional unit of some
commodity is equal to the private cost plus the social costs that result. In the case of
soil erosion, the unit should be an acre of cultivated land and the efficient level
would represent the long run economic costs of soil erosion due to nutrient and
organic matter loss, yield and productivity drops, sedimentation and pollution, and
the reduction of our society’s food supply. A soil erosion tax would essentially be a
land use tax.
The recommendation of a soil erosion tax is nothing particularly novel or
radical; it’s a traditional approach of welfare economic theory. There are multiple
ways to go about Pigouvian taxes (taxing consumer or producers). I recommend a
per unit tax on producers. In practice, this would be a per acreage tax, and therefore
essentially a land use tax. Due to the vast amount of information required for a
Pigouvian tax approach applied to agriculture, critics hold that such a policy is
infeasible.221 However, perfect accuracy is not necessary for an effective Pigouvian
tax; by lowballing the estimated social cost, policy makers can justify a soil erosion
tax as being the least amount that we can afford to pay for soil erosion. Another
criticism of a Pigouvian tax on negative soil externalities of agriculture is that soil
erosion and land degradation tend to increase with poverty; therefore taxes should

E. Kula, Economics of Natural Resources, the Environment and Policies, (Chapman and Hall: London,
1992).
221 Edna T. Loehman and Timothy O. Randhir, “Alleviating soil erosion/pollution stock externalities:
alternative roles for government,” Ecological Economics Vol. 30 (1999), 30.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/56856209?accountid=14070.
220

84

not be imposed on farmers, because the increased tax costs could lead to poverty.222
However, this problem is less significant in the US and could be addressed by
maintaining the already existing farm support system, especially the provision of
countercyclical payments such as subsidized crop insurance and revenue insurance.
What follows in Section 3 of this thesis is an argument for the use of such a
Pigouvian tax strategy applied to soil erosion and an examination of some of the
details and ramifications of its practical application.
3.2

Estimating the Social Cost of Soil Erosion
If Pigouvian taxes are a straightforward solution for agricultural

conservation policy, why is such a policy not already in place? A part of the answer
to this question is that the agribusiness lobby has great influence over the farm bill
and agribusinesses generally do not want to be taxed (later I will argue for why
farmers and agribusinesses should support a soil erosion tax). But another reason
that agricultural policy does not already utilize a Pigouvian tax for the negative
externalities of farming (like soil erosion) is that the issue is incredibly complex and
any estimated value for the efficient level of a soil erosion tax would be inaccurate,
because of the complexity in determining the social cost of soil erosion. The value of
a Pigouvian tax is supposed to represent the social cost of some industry practice
[see figure 5]. The biggest part of the social cost of soil erosion is the lost
productivity over time. Determining the appropriate social cost of soil erosion is a
matter of calculating the long run cost of lost yield due to soil erosion, not an easy
undertaking.
Calculating the efficient level for a per unit tax on soil erosion is technically
problematic because is there are seemingly innumerable assumptions required. Soil
erosion and decreased yields are a nearly inevitable result of cultivation, but to
varying degrees depending on the soil type, the crop planted, the agronomic
techniques used, the topography, the climate, the weather that year, and many,
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many other factors. And then there’s the problem of how to account for the future of
seed technology, because the new seeds farmers use are constantly improving
yields. And although it might be easy to concede defeat in the face of such complex
problem, effective policy action can still be achieved by calculating a value that will
be inevitably inaccurate, but effectively accurate on the correct side of error. What is
needed is a model for calculating the cost of lost yields and productive acreage due
to soil erosion with assumptions that conservatively estimates the value of each
factor, always estimating on the side of error for ‘low-balling’ the estimated social
cost.
The writers of The Economist take up this issue in their defense of carbon tax
strategies:
One objection frequently heard is that Pigouvian taxes require omniscience
from their designers: in order to set the tax at the right level, we need to
know, down to the last few dollars, exactly what the economic impact of
climate change will be—obviously, an impossible task. This is a problem, but
it's not necessarily a fatal one. OK, if we set the tax too low, there'll still be
some residual inefficiencies left that a higher tax would have eliminated. But
it's nevertheless better than not having a tax at all. This objection, it seems to
me, essentially amounts to arguing that since perfection is unattainable, we
should abandon the whole idea rather than merely settling for improving
upon the status quo.223
Likewise for a soil erosion tax, it’s seemingly impossible to calculate the exact
economic impact of soil erosion. As the writers for The Economist point out, this is
problematic, but not fatally so. It can be overcome by lowballing the appropriate
value of the soil erosion tax. Even an inaccurate soil erosion tax would be effective at
incentivizing alternative practices and thereby improving soil erosion rates.
Economists, scientists, and policy makers would be wise to underestimate the social
efficiency in every aspect of the calculation, seeking the path of least political
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resistance. In defense of the tax, it would be an underestimation and therefore the
minimum cost that we can afford to impose. Even a fraction of the real economic
cost of soil erosion, if imposed onto farmers in the form of a tax, should be enough to
incentivize farmers into implementing conservation practices on their own terms.
In order to determine the appropriate tax value, one must apply an erosion
model, such as the models discussed in Part B, Section 1.5, like WEPP, or RUSLE 2, in
order to estimate the volume of soil lost on each given plot of land. Then the tax
values should estimate the lost productivity due the estimated amount of soil
erosion. As mentioned in my discussion of these models, there are limitations to
currently used soil erosion models (such as ephemeral gulley erosion). A Pigouvian
tax approach would benefit from the further development of soil erosion models,
the economic models estimating the costs of erosion, and research into the socially
efficient tax level, in order to improve the accuracy of the estimated social cost.
Research and development into these models should constitute a greater portion of
farm bill spending.
I’m making the argument that a soil erosion tax is a good policy, justified by a
historical approach, but I am not myself offering any model or dollar amount
estimate of what this tax should look like in practice. I will leave that to real
Economists. There is a host of literature that focuses on economic models
concerning soil erosion. Such models are highly technical and a detailed discussion
is beyond the scope of this essay; however their development and progress. In 1983,
Kenneth McConnell published an economic model of soil erosion and
conservation.224 One 1996 study published in the academic journal Ecological
Economics modeled the on-sight and off-sight costs225 of soil erosion with the
primary on-sight cost being lost productivity. The authors then applied the
estimated costs into a general market equilibrium model that they used to

Kenneth E. McConnell, “An Economic Model of Soil Conservation,” American Journal of Economics,
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determine the larger social cost of soil erosion.226 Another study by Edna Loehman
and Timothy Randhir was published in same journal in 1999 that explores various
modeling strategies and policy solutions.227 Another study published by the
Brazilian Soil Science Society (Sociedade Brasileir de Ciência do Solo) compiles
various estimates on the on-site and off-site costs of soil erosion into a single metaanalysis for estimating the total economic costs of soil erosion.228 The authors of
each essay admit that their models are rough estimations of a complex issue but
that’s the nature of the problem at hand. Policy makers should take a cue from these
researchers and use the best tools available in order to address the externalities of
soil erosion head on.
3.3

Parallels Between Agricultural Policy and Climate Change Policy: Present and

Future Value
Both agricultural conservation policy and climate change policy aim to
address the tendency of free market behavior to discount the present value of
externalities that lie in the distant future. Just as the costs of greenhouse gas
emissions are felt in the distant future once greenhouse gas pollution has built up
over time and become severe enough to cause significant damage, the greatest costs
of soil erosion lie in the distant future, once soil erosion has become severe enough
over time that the productive capacity of American agriculture is greatly diminished.
Private enterprise and sustainable agriculture are in discord because the short run
demands of the market dictate the behavior of farmers, and the ecological costs of
farming are discounted over time into the present market. Focusing on the analogy
between climate change policy and agricultural policy, this section examines the
role that discounting plays in our behavior and estimation of future ecological costs.
The underlying fracture between private enterprise and sustainable
agriculture is a conflict between present and future value. The microeconomic
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behavior of individuals in the market is that we prefer money in the present, more
than we prefer money in the future. Would you rather have $100 today, or $100 a
year from now? Economic theory (and common sense) says that people prefer $100
today, rather than a year from now, because the $100 received immediately could
be invested or placed in a savings account and would grow over time. The
interesting question is, how much more do we value things in the present than the
future? Would you rather have $100 today or $101 a year from now? A rational
person (which none of us really are) would take $100 today because they could
invest it and watch it grow to be greater than $101 a year later. This assumption,
that $100 today is worth more than $100 a year from now is called the ‘Time Value
of Money’ principle. If the prevailing interest rate is 4%, then a rational person
would only prefer sums greater than $104 a year from now, instead of $100 today.
The amount that any value is discounted annually is called the discount rate. If the
prevailing interest rate is high, then the observable discount rate229 is high and the
present value of future money decreases, because we expect even greater returns in
the future.
This same principle (Time Value of Money) holds for costs just as it does for
returns. Now the question is, would you rather pay $100 today, or $104 a year from
now? What would you pay now, to avoid costs later? The answer still depends on
the prevailing interest rate, that is the discount rate in this context, but the present
value of money always decreases as the event (cost or return) moves further into
the future. Soil erosion has to do with discount rates in that the cost of soil erosion is
a cost felt in the distant future once the topsoil has been so severely eroded that
yields plummet and farmers face the cost of lost productivity. Assuming a farmer
does in fact weigh this distant cost when making decisions in the present, the
present value of the future cost of lost productivity from soil erosion, is discounted
over time and the resulting present value of this lost productivity becomes
inadequately small for inspiring any change of market behavior in the present.
the discount rate that we observe real people behaving with in the market, as opposed to a
discount rate set in a present value calculation that is theoretical and might take other factors into
consideration than the average person does in practice
229
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There is a parallel between agricultural conservation policy and climate
change policy; both aim to ‘internalize the externalities’ of industry practices. For
climate change policy, the goal is to make firms accountable for the greenhouse gas
emissions that result from their industry practices, incentivizing alternative
practices that are more ecologically friendly. Likewise, the goal of agricultural
conservation policy is to make farmers accountable for their ecological footprint and
to incentivize ecologically friendly farming practices. Within climate change debates,
economists generally advocate the use of a carbon tax in order to achieve improve
general welfare. This is a traditional Pigouvian tax strategy of applying the social
cost of industry practices into the decision making of firms. As I mentioned above,
the widely respected magazine, The Economist, has long advocated for a carbon
tax.230
The discount rates set in climate change models are a key factor in
determining carbon taxes and other policy implemented costs on industry meant to
reflect the future costs of ecological damage. As previously illustrated, discounting is
a procedure for computing the present value of financial flows in the future.231 From
one side of the debate, there is the argument that using any discount rate in our
climate-policy models, especially discount rates that reflect the real return of capital
and the prevailing interest rates, puts future generations at an inherent
disadvantage by lessening the present weight of future events. Discounting is
already a part of our behavior and our current behavior is exactly the problem; our
short-run market forces are failing to feel the weight of distant economic costs until
it is too late to do anything about it. However, from the other side of the debate
there is the argument that given the nature of capital returns, discounting is an
objective and necessary aspect of the present value of future events.
The debate between Cambridge economist Nicolas Stern and William
Nordhaus of Yale is an archetype for disagreement over discount rates: ‘the
alarmist’ vs. ‘the delayer’. Generally, the disagreement is over how much to impose
"Some More Thoughts On A Carbon Tax," The Economist.
Cedric Philibert, Discounting The Future, International Society for Ecological Economics (2003), 2,
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the future cost into the present through the use of climate policy, but the heart of the
debate lies in Nordhaus’s disagreement with the near-zero time discount rate used
by Stern’s climate change model in his famed Stern Review. Nicolas Stern, former
World Bank chief economist published the Stern Review: The Economics of Climate
Change in 2006, a research publication sponsored by the UK government that
argued for urgent policy action in order to prevent the future damage of climate
change.232 Stern’s results were more dramatic than most reviews that came before
his because the discount rates used in his economic models were set extremely low.
Discounting involves two related concepts: the discount rate of goods and the ‘time
discount rate’. The discount rate of goods (also called the real return on capital or
the real interest rate) is a positive economic concept233 that is, in principle, the
observable discount rate in the market, which is known to range from about 5 to 26
percent per year.234 The ‘time discount rate’ (also known as the pure rate of social
time preference) is a normative value that represents the relative weight of the
economic welfare of various households and generations over time. This refers to
the discount of future welfare, not future goods or capital returns. A zero time
discount rate means that all generations are treated symmetrically with present
generations. Stern applied a 0.1 percent time discount rate, and combined this 0.1
time discount rate with a variety of discount rates of goods for the various different
goods that are relevant to climate change and the associated real return of capital
for these goods, and came up with a 1.4 full discount rate, which was in turn applied
to his economic climate change models.235 In defense of the low time discount rate,
Stern argues that basic human ethics calls for the recognition of intergenerational
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common humanity and historical responsibility. The Stern Review concludes that
without climate-policy action, climate change will be the greatest market failure in
human history and is estimated to cost 5 percent of the global GDP every year
indefinitely and could range up to a loss of 20 percent of the global GDP annually.236
However, William Nordhaus is skeptical of the conclusions of the Stern
Review because of the assumptions made about discounting. Firstly, Nordhaus
argues that the ethical stance from which Stern draws his discount rate isn’t quite so
universal as his Review might have one believe. He claims that the Review’s near zero
discount rate is based on utilitarian reasoning and brings with it all of the
complications of that viewpoint, most infamously that the ends always justify the
means. Supposedly, there are many alternative ethical stances which justify
discounting; a Rawlsian ethics, where societies should maximize the wellbeing of
the poorest generation, which we assume is us, and so consumption should be at
maximum now; or a precautionary ethics where societies minimize consumption
while maintaining the path closest to risking overconsumption. Nordhaus argues
there are a multitude of various different time preference rates that are each
justifiable.237 I however find his arguments unconvincing. He fails to clearly provide
any justification for putting future generations at an extreme disadvantage in our
decision making process.
Nordhaus accuses Stern of playing into political pressures of the UK
government and giving them an unambiguous answer that urgent and sharp
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions were necessary in order to prevent
widespread market collapse. President Harry Truman famously complained that
economists always told him this on the one hand, and that on the other hand. He
wanted a one-handed economist. The Stern Review was essentially a one-handed
report with an argument for urgent policy action in mind. However, economics is
rarely so simple, especially not an intertemporal economic model over centuries
with, not only known unknowns, but innumerable unknown unknowns. According
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to Nordhaus, the question has always been, to what degree, how fast and how much,
to impose a carbon tax, and the use of a near-zero percent time discount rate is not
by any means a silver-bullet to answering this fundamental question of climate
change policy.238
Although Nordhaus doubts the economic models and assumptions used by
Stern, he commends the Review for pointing out climate change policies that can
align economic priorities with environmental dangers. Nordhaus agrees with Stern
that the cost of carbon emissions must be raised in order to incentivize individuals
and firms into more environmentally friendly practices, and to stimulate research
and development into low-carbon technologies. It’s a simple economic insight that
the social costs of the distant future must be reflected onto the everyday decisionmaking of billions of individuals and firms in the present.239
The debate over climate change policy provides a useful parallel with
agricultural policy. Just as the debate between Nordhaus and Stern over climate
change policy isn’t about whether or not to impose a carbon tax, because the need
for a carbon tax in general is widely accepted amongst economists, the question
becomes, what is the appropriate amount for a carbon tax? Likewise, if we accept
that a Pigouvian tax strategy applied to the externalities of agriculture would be a
good policy, then the next question becomes, how high should a soil erosion tax be?
Discounting is major factor in determining the efficient level for any Pigouvian tax.
Discounting is an undeniable fact of economic behavior. Rational economic
agents behave in a way so that money is more valuable today then tomorrow. When
a homeowner takes out a mortgage of $150,000 to buy a $200,000 home, it’s
worthwhile even though over the course of paying off the mortgage, it will be more
expensive than the original $150,000. At a 6 percent interest rate over 30 years, that
mortgage would cost $323,759. This isn’t unfair, because the extra $173,759 from
accumulated interest represents the opportunity cost of capital growth over that
period of time. The homeowner who took out this mortgage made this decision
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based on the rationale that having an additional $150,000 in the present was worth
paying an additional $173,759 later. In this way, discounting is fair and fundamental
to economic theory, because investments and capital are productive over time. 240
Yet, one can argue, it remains fundamentally problematic that rational decisionmakers discount the value of ecological damages in the distant future. Our
systematic disregard for ecological limits might justifying Stern’s use of a very low
discount rate in order to correct present markets.
At first, it seems imperative that a near-zero percent discount rate is used in
order to fairly account for the real damages of the future due to soil erosion. It
seems shortsighted to argue for discount rates of 5 percent in climate change
models (or presumably in soil erosion tax models), like Jerry Taylor, a writer for the
conservative think tank Cato Institute does. In Taylor’s defense, 5 percent is roughly
the observable discount rate, the real return of capital, representative of the
prevailing interest rates, and thus accurate of how we really behave in the
market.241 But a 5 percent discount rate means that the weight of distant events like
climate change are not felt until it’s far too late. From the viewpoint of positive
economists like Nordhaus and Taylor, it is simply an economic fact that the present
value of ecological catastrophes is discounted over time. Their evidence is the
observable economic behavior. But this is exactly the problem! Current economic
behavior is failing to adequately value future natural resources and ecological
disasters. The parameters of the market are pushing farmers and agribusiness into
remaining financially solvent and price competitive in the present, but failing to
adjust for long-run consequences. It is not the job government economic policy to be
practice only factual positive economics, without value judgments. Government
policy is one place where normative economic value judgments are essential.
Positive economists like Nordhaus and Taylor might argue that the observed
discount rate suggests that we value possessing the financial means to address
William Nordhaus, Climate Casino: Risk, Uncertainty, and Economics for a Warming World, (New
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2013), accessed March 1, 2016,
http://site.ebrary.com.ezproxy.csbsju.edu/lib/csbsju/reader.action?docID=10793689
241 Jerry Taylor, “Nordhaus vs. Stern,” Cato at Liberty, November 28, 2006,
http://www.cato.org/blog/nordhaus-vs-stern.
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incoming disasters more than forgoing growth in the name of avoiding those
disasters. But this is still only a description of what we have already done, not what
we should do.
I’m definitely more sympathetic with Stern than Nordhaus. Discounting is a
fact of normal economic behavior, which has led us down a disastrous path where
we fail to value the long run costs of our actions, like ecological costs. Nonetheless,
Nordhaus and other critics of Stern bring forward legitimate objections, the most
persuasive of which that we need to account for alternative investments and
opportunity costs. Nordhaus writes:
A portfolio of efficient investments would definitely include ones to slow
global warming. But it also includes investments in other priority areas—
health systems at home, cures for tropical diseases, education around the
world, and basic research on all kinds of new technologies. Investments to
slow global warming should compete with other investments, and the
discount rate is the measuring rod for comparing competing investments.242
According to the critics of Stern, a soil erosion tax should be one of many
investments towards greater social welfare. This investment would be like an
insurance policy against the probable long run costs that would result from
continuing the current trends of soil erosion. In order for agricultural policy makers
to implement a soil erosion tax, they must make assumptions about discount rates
used in their models for estimating the appropriate tax value. Discounting is key to
determining how much to invest in a soil erosion tax insurance policy and any such
soil erosion tax will require economic models very similar to those of Stern and
Nordhaus.
Although Stern and Nordhaus disagree on the degree of climate policy action
that should be taken, they both see the utility of an emissions tax for incentivizing
better industry practices. Likewise, a soil erosion tax would have great usefulness,
even if its social efficiency value were underestimated. I think that discounting,
despite being a rational aspect of economic behavior, is exactly the problem of
242
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commercial values and ecological sustainability, but in the interest of crafting a
pragmatic agricultural policy that follows the path of least political resistance, the
discount rates used in a soil erosion tax should be set conservatively. The use of a
soil erosion tax would provide a path for maximizing profits over the long run. It
would essentially be an insurance policy against the risks of soil erosion. In order to
avoid the damages of soil erosion that are probable in the distant future, we should
invest small amounts annually by paying additional costs for the farming practices
that are estimated to lead to greater erosion. We must redefine markets so that our
present behavior does not compromise agriculture in the coming centuries.

3.4

Learning from history
The Environmental Working Group (EWG) is a non-profit organization

dedicated to empowering people to live healthier lives in a healthier environment.
Their strategy for accomplishing this goal is by researching complex issues on
toxins, food, agriculture, children’s health, energy, and water, and simplifying the
problems for consumer awareness. EWG is also a significant lobbying force in
Washington for environmental reform. EWG enters the conversation about
agricultural with the bias that strict environmental regulation is necessary for
correcting the tendencies of unregulated commercial behavior. 243
The Environmental Working Group’s Publication, Losing Ground, presents a
good summary of the issue of at hand, acknowledging the prevalence of
unsustainable soil erosion and the systematic flaws of lowering erosion rates; their
summary includes items discussed in Part B Section 1 of this essay such as
inaccurate T-values, and soil erosion models that consistently underestimate the

Mission statement and general information on the Environmental Working Group taken from the
EWG website, accessed March 25, 2016. http://www.ewg.org/
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real amount of erosion that is occurring. However, the recommended policy
solutions of the authors are politically unpragmatic. They call on congress to reopen
and revise the conservation compliance policies of the 1985 farm bill that were
removed by the 1996 farm bill and to require the following in order to remain
eligible for the rest of farm support:


Reduce soil erosion to below T-values



Treat and prevent the formation of ephemeral gullies on all
agricultural land, not just highly erodible land



Plant a vegetative buffer of at least 35 feet between row crops and
watersheds



Exclude farmers who do not comply with these conservation
measures from participating in crop and revenue insurance
programs.



Exclude farmers who convert native prairie grass into row crops. 244

EWG believes that conservation compliance will be an adequate solution to
the unsustainable loss of soil resources, despite their acknowledgment that is has
failed in the past. But what evidence is there to think conservation compliance will
finally be successful this time? There are reasons why conservation compliance has
been inadequate in the past - most importantly, the lack of support from farmers for
strict localized oversight - and there is little reason to think things have changed.
Erosion is a cost of farming. Farmers’ behavior will not adjust until markets
represent that cost. To their accredit, the recommendations of EWG would adjust
markets so that what is economical for American farmers is improved conservation
practices. Also, the suggestions of EWG are slightly revised from the conservation
compliance policy of the 1985 Food Security Act. The ‘85 farm bill mandated that
farmers establish a ‘conservation plan’ and was problematically vague. Here, the
EWG suggests that conservation compliance should be defined by operating with
soil erosion rates under assigned T-values.
244
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However there are complications with the EWG’s suggestions. What T-values
will they use? Even if one could find an accurate T-value for every plot of land, it
would be unrealistic to expect that the USDA could set a benchmark for total soil
erosion sustainability at some specified time after the legislation. Despite the use of
the best available conservation practices, soil erosion often remains greater than
what is actually tolerable. Demanding that farmers practice with erosion rates that
mirror soil formation rates sets up farmers for an impossible task and it would be
unreasonable to expect NRCS agents to cut all of the farmers from the income
support they depend on if they do not ‘comply’. If policy makers were to use Tvalues as the measurement for conservation compliance, T-values would instead
need to lower than true soil erosion tolerance, like the currently existing T-levels.
But then farmers would be at risk of losing their government farm support based
upon an arbitrary standard. EWG might respond that the Pigouvian tax strategy that
I recommend of low-balling the social cost of soil erosion also results in an arbitrary
standard, and this is true. But the difference is that in the case of a soil erosion tax
farmers are not forced to comply at the threat of bankruptcy to the arbitrary
standards that we set for practicality’s sake.
Another complication to conservation compliance is the idea of putting
farmers under the threat of bankruptcy. US farm policy always has, and for the
practical purposes of a pragmatic policy maker, always will exist for the interests of
American farmers. It is impractical of the EWP and other environmentalists to pit
themselves against the interests of farmers and agribusinesses in order to establish
conservation – these groups essentially write the farm bill. But beyond pragmatism,
this severe penalty of violating conservation compliance would unreasonably leave
farmers at the mercy of weather and climate. It would make the case that one year,
despite the best attempts at implementing conservation practices, one farmer’s
erosion rates might be estimated to be above T-values, disqualifying them for farm
support, while another farmer who implements less conservation practices is lucky
with the weather and suffers no consequences. Then there is the problem that once
farmers are below the benchmark of these arbitrary and unrealistically high Tvalues, there is no further incentive for conservation practices.
98

One could avoid the problems inherent in using T-values by creating
conservation compliance standards of implementing specific farming practices,
decided at the local level by NRCS agencies. This suddenly empowered NRCS could
mandate that all farmers eligible for government support must practice no-till
farming (whether that be no-till year-round, every year, or some tilling allowed) and
plant filter strips along the edge of their fields, riparian buffers where streams run,
contour strips and vegetative barriers across slopes in the middle of fields, and
grass waterways in the places where ephemeral gullies form. This approach would
be preferable to that of enforcing the T-value benchmark, because it is easy to
measure and hold farmers accountable for implementing specific practices.
However it is difficult to see how the local NRCS agents could determine standards
fairly in each situation without some objective measurement.
More importantly there is an issue of enforcement, which we have seen has
been a problem in earlier programs. In order to ensure that conservation
compliance is strictly enforced, there would need to be a strict overrule of the local
NRCS agents over the farmers and their conservation practices. Few farmers or
NRCS agents want a system of ‘soil cops’. Even if such a tight oversight and
authoritative bureaucracy is desirable, it’s unreasonable to think it would ever be
sustained by the involvement of local farmers after it is put into place by federal
legislation. The failure of strict oversight on private land through the use of soil
conservation committees was a lamentation of Lewis Cecil Gray, Worster’s hero of
the New Deal Agricultural reform, long before the failure of conservation
compliance since the 1985 farm bill. And now the EWG suggests we try the same
approach again. History warrants a new approach. We need to learn from the failed
attempts of the past and implement an appropriate and more effective agricultural
conservation policy.
3.5

Farmers and Agribusiness Should Support a Soil Erosion Tax
The idea of placing a soil erosion tax onto farmers would probably be met

with immediate hostility by the farmer and agribusiness lobby. However, I believe
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that such a knee jerk reaction against a soil erosion tax is mistaken and that if
farmers and agribusiness consider its benefits and the alternatives, a soil erosion tax
is the best way for farmers to practice sustainably while remaining financially
solvent.
The fact that US farm policy always has been and still is a tool almost
exclusively for the economic interests of farmers should not discredit the
practicality of conservation policy. It is entirely within long-run profit seeking
behavior to conserve soil. If we do not conserve our nation’s soil there will
eventually be no more economic opportunity in agriculture (never mind the fact
that we would starve first, or that skyrocketing prices of food would never actually
allow us to erode or deplete all of our topsoil). Even within a purely commercialized
view of the world, soil conservation remains an urgent priority.
Farmers and agribusiness have not yet established sustainable soil
conservation by their own accord because of significant obstacles. Firstly, there is no
individual, or group of farmers in control of agriculture markets; the US agricultural
market is instead more like a magnificent beast which is pulled in this and that
direction by the demands and competitive advantages of the global economy, then
meagerly called in another direction by political forces like the farm bill and the
NRCS. Even the most massive agribusinesses do not have the power to suddenly
decide to practice completely sustainable agriculture (whatever that would entail)
and implement the necessary and expensive conservations measures. Any
agribusiness acting alone would likely suffer by mandating even simple
conservation practices such as alternating crops with cultivated fallows. Too many
farmers would decide to affiliate with a different agribusiness that does not impose
restrictions. It is incredibly difficult for a single farmer or agribusiness firm to
behave with long run ecological considerations because there is a competitive
advantage for suppliers who produce more efficiently in the short run.
But remaining price competitive isn’t the only obstacle; the demands of
consumers hold great sway over the behavior of farmers. Consider the poor
conversion efficiency of grain to beef. Instead of grazing (grass-fed) cattle, almost all
beef in the US is now ‘corn-fed’. Because it takes approximately 6-8 pounds of grain
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to produce 1 pound of beef in the US (worse elsewhere)245 beef demand is
exponentially grows into higher demand for corn. High demand means better prices
and so farmers are incentivized to farm more corn and pumping more revenue onto
their farms. Nonetheless, corn fed beef is a blatantly inefficient use of food and soil
resources. Even if they wanted, neither the individual corn farmers, the Iowa Corn
Growers Association, cattle growers nor beef processors could change the market in
order to streamline production to consumption efficiency and eliminate corn fed
beef in order to release some of the strain on our soil. If they tried, some other link
in the supply chain would take their place. Economies have sticking power, and now
that markets are used to farmers growing millions of acres of corn, and food
producers are used to processing millions of acres of corn, and consumers are used
to eating the livestock produced off of feed from millions of acres of corn, things are
unlikely to change.
Another obstacle to the marriage of private enterprise and sustainable
agriculture, mentioned several times now, is the fact that not all costs are
represented in the decision making of farmers today; the far distant effects of our
actions remain unfelt to us. And so, the solution proposed is to reframe the short run
market forces with the long run economic costs of soil erosion in mind. Rather than
spending billions every year on the farm bill as it stands - a confused patchwork
safety net that breathes life into a broken system - the US government should
instead spend billions of dollars collecting data to perfect the USDA and NRCS soil
erosion models. An advanced soil erosion model could be used to calculate the long
run cost of every immediate farming practice, impose that given cost onto the
farmer in the form of a tax and watch the short run market forces defend long run
soil sustainability. The imposition of a per unit tax on land would raise the cost of
practicing agriculture to varying degrees246, depending on the predicted soil erosion
provided by our imaginary advanced model. Farmers would then seek to minimize

United Nation’s Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Global Sustainability (2012), Resilient
People, Resilient Planet: A Future Worth Choosing. New York: United Nations, 30.
246 This price inflation would start with increased price of land, but also ripple through to increased
price of agricultural commodities, food, and also seed and machinery technology.
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soil erosion on their land in order to avoid larger taxes. In practice, this would entail
cooperation between soil erosion estimates on every cultivated field in tandem with
an annual IRS audit. In this way, agricultural policy could achieve the goals of
conservation compliance – adjust market conditions so that conservation practices
are economical for farmers – while avoiding the subjective discretion of localized
oversight which has historically proven to be the downfall for conservation policies.
It’s important to recognize that the prevalence of soil erosion is not the result
of any particularly malicious intent of farmers towards the environment. The
inability of individuals to change the market as a whole, the nature of price
competition, the demands of consumers, and the ambiguity of soil erosion and other
agricultural externalities are all significant obstacles towards reconciling private
enterprise with sustainable agriculture. A soil erosion tax is the most feasible way of
overcoming these obstacles because it holds every farmer accountable to the same
standard, while also respecting the autonomy of farmers to implement conservation
practices as they see fit. This policy would increase the costs of farming, but over
time the price of agricultural commodities would rise to account for the tax costs
and farmers would be not disastrously affected. If the transition to the new market
equilibrium puts too much strain onto farmers, they could still be protected under
the traditional farm support system. Furthermore, gaining tax revenue is not the
purpose of a soil erosion tax, or any Pigouvian tax, but it certainly would be an
added benefit for what has historically been a costly US farm policy.
US farm policy already has some methods for representing the long run
ecological costs of practicing agriculture into the present. But unfortunately, the
existing policies fall far short of fostering sustainable agriculture. And so
reconfiguring these market conditions to better represent the future costs of
present action would not be anything new in principle, though more assertive policy
action may be the necessary change for achieving our economic and environmental
goals. Assertive conservation policy has typically been opposed by the farmer and
agribusiness lobby, but if these interest groups carefully consider the opportunity
provided by a soil erosion tax - taking a significant step in the direction of soil
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sustainability while remaining on the same playing field of every other US farmer,
staying financially solvent in the process – they should favor the tax.
3.6

Externalities
This section will not go into great detail or length into the externalities that

would result from implementing a soil erosion tax, but merely to point a few that
seem likely. I lack the broad knowledge necessary for a full-blown defense of a soil
tax in terms of its consequences. The bulk of this essay has relied on mostly
historical justifications for a soil erosion tax, but the purpose of this section is to
briefly consider some of the probable externalities from imposing a soil erosion tax.
The imposition of a soil erosion tax would make US agricultural commodities
less competitive on the global market. Taxes increase the price of production. A per
acre tax on soil erosion would increase the price of land and the price of practicing
agriculture. If the costs of farming are increased in the US, but not elsewhere, then
American agricultural commodities will have a competitive disadvantage in the
global market. Although this might seem like a bad thing for US farm policy to be
doing to its own farmers, from a global justice perspective, this would be a
significant step in the right direction. The presence of cheap agricultural
commodities from outside exports can lower prices so that the revenue of farmers
in developing nations falls below sufficient operating costs. Price competition has
been identified as the chief culprit by global agriculture academics, like Mazoyer and
Roudart, authors of A History of World Agriculture. They believe that in order to
establish a prosperous and ecologically harmonious agriculture around the world,
there cannot be price competition for agricultural commodities in the same way as
other economic goods. Global justice activists Mazoyer and Roudart see the patterns
of trade liberalization as problematic. The liberalization of global trade allows for
the most price efficient producers to expand and dominate global markets. The
problem is that farmers in developing countries are not always the most priceefficient. Rural farmers around the world have been suffering from a global
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agricultural market where consumption tends to align with the lowest prices.247
Often the lowest prices align with the exporters of surplus produce such as the
United States who exported over $140 billion in agricultural commodities in
2014.248 Although the imposition of a soil erosion tax would not end the global
agricultural price war that puts the farmers of the developing world at a
disadvantage and reaffirms the cycle of global poverty, a soil erosion tax would
increase the price of American produced agricultural economies and would
therefore promote increased prices and revenue for poor farmers around the world.
There simply aren’t a lot of market opportunities in developing countries. When
manufacturing giants like China, Germany and the US dominate global markets,
there are significant disadvantages and barriers to entry for small manufacturers.
Agriculture is one industry that every nation has a very viable capacity for – that is
until excessive imports from America and Europe drive prices too low for local
farmers. And so the soil erosion tax externality of decreased US exports seems
unproblematic in the grand scheme.
Another externality of a soil erosion tax is the potential for putting farmers
below the costs of operation with the newly imposed costs of the tax. For this
reason, farm policy should continue to protect farmers against downside risk,
primarily through the use of crop and revenue insurance programs. The purpose of
US agricultural policy to promote the welfare of American agriculture, so there is no
reason to harm US farmers and agribusinesses. Agribusinesses are indeed very
much concerned with finding what is sustainable, but no individual within the
market has the power to totally redefine the market – they instead react to the
market conditions already in place. Farmers and agribusiness understand that the
current rate of soil erosion is not sustainable. But decreasing the amount of acres
planted on, utilizing crop rotations and fallows to the degree of complete soil
erosion sustainability, seems impossible at the moment. If some individual farmer
or agribusiness committed wholeheartedly to soil sustainability as the ultimate
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deciding factor in all of their decisions, they would need to decrease the frequency
of planting on each acre in order to allow for the slow regeneration of natural
topsoil. It would become incredibly difficult for this individual to remain price
competitive against their neighbors who continue to practice immediately cost
effective agriculture. This is why the correction of US agricultural must instead come
from government policy, a greater regulating force that can ensure all individuals
within that market behave with a mind for the cost of sustainability. Because there
is no reason to blame or punish farmers and agribusiness, the continued protection
against downside risk for farmers seems reasonable. Also the imposition of the tax
should be phased in over time so that farmers and the market are able to adjust to
the increased costs of farming.
Farm policy can continue to protect farmers against downside risk and total
bankruptcy. However another related and more complicated externality is the
disadvantage of farmers on highly erodible land, often-poorer farmers. Some might
say that it’s not fair to craft a tax that disadvantages those who own highly erodible
land. I would counter by saying that this tax is fair in the sense that all erosion is
treated as equally problematic and that we are imposing the real costs of that
erosion through cold cut and unwavering environmental justice. Surely, this would
not be to the advantage of farmers on highly erodible land – too bad. If erosion on
some given land is so severe that the social costs of erosion when imposed onto the
farmer put them at an extreme competitive disadvantage, then land shouldn’t be
farmed.
Also the price of food would likely increase in the US (just like gas taxes raise
prices for consumers) causing problems for those who live on minimum wage. But
the price of food wouldn’t not rise significantly if farmers’ revenue is increased to
match the increased costs from the tax. I’m not really endorsing that the
government increases subsidies along with the tax so that food prices remain stable,
but I’m pointing out that it’s an option. With this option, the soil erosion tax code
would incentivize conservation practices while farmers’ balance sheets would
remain steady along with food prices.
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3.7

Conclusions
Worster argued that capitalistic values are at the root of agriculture’s

problems and that a system of individuals seeking ever-greater financial returns is
inherently flawed and will never foster an agricultural industry that is in harmony
with ecological limits. However, it is not the luxury of government policy to
suddenly and dramatically change the pathway of our economy. Instead, I have
argued in Part B for a government policy that establishes the market conditions of
private enterprise in a way that profit-seeking behavior is identical to ecologically
sustainable behavior. One straightforward solution with this goal in mind is to
impose the long run cost of soil erosion onto the present actions that lead to soil
erosion – essentially a ‘carbon tax’ approach applied to agriculture.

Part C: Summary and Conclusions
The dust bowl is an archetype for agriculture and ecological limits. The dust
bowl is relevant to this essay, firstly because it illustrates the primacy of market
forces over ecological considerations in the decision making of farmers, and
secondly, because the failure of the policy response to the dust bowl to universally
coerce farmers into applying conservation measures on private land suggests that a
more pragmatic approach is needed in the face of contemporary environmental
challenges. Modern US agricultural policy was born during the dust bowl years, yet
the relationship between private enterprise in agriculture and ecological limits has
not fundamentally changed in the 83 years since the New Deal agricultural policy
began.
The primacy of short run market considerations over ecological ones isn’t to
say that farmers don’t care about the ecology or conservation, but that in general,
farmers follow the practice that is cost effective first, then find ways to improve
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ecological stewardship. Agriculture in the US began seriously infringing on the
ecological limits of the Great Plains, with the onset of commercial monocropping
and industrially mechanized agriculture in the early 20th century. There was an
amazing growth of US agricultural production from 1900 – 1930. Shortsighted
agricultural practices and speculative growth led farmers to plow up native sod on a
massive scale in preference for cultivating wheat, often on semi-arid and
marginalized land like the southern plains. Farmers were like cogs in the machine of
the global market, claiming homesteads and increasing planting to match the rise in
demand for agricultural products, with the greatest increase in demand coming
from WWI. When prices eventually dropped, the market was pushing individual
farmers into increasing planting in a last ditch effort to avoid bankruptcy, but
instead extreme oversupply ensued along with an extended wind erosion disaster
like never before seen. The decades of speculative growth leading up to the 1930s,
and the dust bowl itself exemplified how the trends of commercial agriculture and
the limits of our ecology can contradict one another.
Donald Worster’s Dust Bowl was a groundbreaking work in critical
environmental history and I agree with Worster’s general thesis, that a system of
individuals seeking ever-greater financial returns will never foster an agricultural
industry that is in harmony with ecological limits. However, Worster’s prescribed
solution, a revision of cultural values, is not a practical policy solution. Agricultural
policy, like any government policy, tends to shift the already existing system in
small, but hopefully meaningful ways, little by little. Whether or not change is
preferable through the slow methods of government policy (as opposed to perhaps
some radical revolution and ownership change of American agriculture) is not
within the scope of this essay. Instead this essay asks: how can policy makers work
towards the marriage of private enterprise and sustainable agriculture?
Worster pointed out that the policy makers of 1930s aimed to accomplish
this through localized grassroots community oversight. The idea was that the
federal government was an inappropriate authority for mandating agricultural
conservation and would never be accepted by farmers. Therefore, localized
oversight, committees comprised of farmers, would be a better system for ensuring
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that soil conservation was implemented on private land. Worster depicted the
situation as if these local committees of strict oversight were formed and then
quickly dissolved into nothing because there wasn’t enough political support and
involvement from farmers on the local level for policing each other and restricting
their own profits in the name of ecological stewardship. But from what I have
gathered, these localized committees still exist today in the same form as always –
soil conservation districts. Farmers getting assistance from soil conservation
districts is voluntary – the districts lack the authority to coerce farmers into
implementing conservation practices against their will. The localized committees
lacked the power that New Deal policy makers like Bennett and Gray hoped to
establish. The dust bowl illustrated that policy makers do not lightly overcome the
autonomy of farmers. Therefore a successful and pragmatic agricultural policy
ought to respect the autonomy of farmers’ private decision making, when possible.
This means that farmers should be the ones who choose to implement conservation
practices on their land, and they should do so on their own terms.
Merging the two previously mentioned lessons of the dust bowl together,
that farmers are primarily concerned with short run market forces, and that a
successful agricultural policy should be a pragmatic one that respects the autonomy
of farmers on their own land, a soil erosion tax would be a straightforward means of
incentivizing conservation practices. A soil erosion tax is a way of directly affecting
the short run market forces of farmers so that farming practices that reduce erosion
are more cost effective, and it would leave the farmer autonomous, implementing
conservation on their own terms and free to not implement certain conservation
practices if they so choose.
History is filled with examples where unaddressed soil erosion resulted in
the decline of civilizations. Lowdermilk’s survey of ancient agricultural lands found
many examples of failed agricultures that expired with the erosion of their soil. The
risk remains the same with contemporary soil erosion.
Taking a cue from Lowdermilk, one can simplify the issue of soil erosion and
conservation agriculture (ignoring many of the complexities of land degradation and
soil health) as seeking a permanent agriculture defined by establishing equal soil
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formation and erosion rates. There have been fewer studies on soil formation rates
on agricultural land relative to erosion rates. Soil scientists understand the process
of soil formation, but the rates of formation under cultivation remain ambiguous. It’s
easier to quantify soil erosion than formation. However there is a host of literature
on the effects of crop litter removal (especial corn stover) on soil health.
Maintaining a layer of crop litter is an important agronomic technique for lowering
erosion rates, but also for increasing soil formation rates and soil organic material
(SOM). In comparison, there have been many studies on soil erosion rates and the
USDA has been continuously developing and improving upon their soil erosion
estimation models. Soil scientists have gained a solid understanding of how erosion
rates vary on specific fields with various inputs, but there remain significant
obstacles to overcome in estimating soil erosion, most prominent of which being
ephemeral gulley erosion. Additionally, there has been significant progress in the
implementation of soil conservation practices, such as no-till farming. But our best
agronomic techniques are not yet a cure all for the problems of soil erosion, and
worse, they remain far from universally adopted.
There are important and simple facts to be considered by policy makers on
the status of soil erosion and formation rates, and our agronomy for improving
them: 1) The stakes are high when it comes to soil erosion; maintaining the stock,
health, and productivity of our soil is fundamental to the longevity of our
civilization, 2) We lack adequate data, and consequently understanding, of the soil
formation and erosion rates that are prevalent under cultivation, 3) there are
beneficial conservation practices that are proven to work, yet these practices are
not implemented across the board. These three aforementioned facts are not highly
contentious. Policy makers should accept these basic facts of the matter and then
decide how we should proceed.
I argue that these facts justify implementing a soil erosion tax. Taxing soil
erosion would greatly increase the prevalence of currently available conservation
practices across the board. We possess the means for practicing conservation
agriculture on a more widespread scale than is done, but the incentives are in the
wrong place. Taxing ‘bads’, like soil erosion, would be a simple yet effective way for
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adjusting these incentives. Furthermore, it’s important to strive for a complete
understanding of that which is taxed, and so farm bill spending ought to allocate
more funds to the USDA and NRCS for research, data collection, and erosion
modeling. 249 Soil erosion models should be continuously improved upon, as well as
our understanding of the costs associated with soil erosion. The fact that Rick
Cruse’s ongoing and cutting-edge research into the economic costs and yield
declines from soil erosion is the result of a grant for only $15,768 from the Leopold
Center is ridiculous and sad. Given the history of failed agriculture and expired
civilizations, understanding the real economic impact of soil erosion so that the
appropriate costs can be accounted for should be one of the most important and
well-funded of research endeavors around, yet it seems to be on the fringes of
politician’s and mainstream academia’s concerns.
Like the dust bowl, significant lessons can be learned from the history of US
agricultural policy since WWII. Examining this time period gives one a sense of how
stuck we’ve become in the price support system that inflates the value of
agricultural commodities, and also how difficult it is to phase out farm bill spending.
It also provides further justification for reforming agricultural conservation policy
into a system that doesn’t depend on local initiative for its success.
Since Hugh Bennett and the creation of the SCS, the goal of agricultural
conservation policy has been to better represent the long run costs of ecological
damage into the present decision making of farming. Land retirement programs
have been a staple of conservation policy since the beginning, effectively making
what was long run ecologically beneficial, cost effective in the short run for farmers.
But throughout the history of conservation programs, conservation policies were
almost exclusively implemented when they were to the economic advantage of
farmers. Oversupply in the 1930s made land retirement programs a practical means
for limiting production and thereby contributing to the general prosperity of
Or even without a soil erosion tax, the further research, data collection and precise understanding
of soil erosion would help farmers identify the costs of soil erosion and implement conservation
agriculture to a greater degree. Although this alone would likely be insufficient, largely because of
discounting behavior, and also because of the primacy of short run market demands for farmers to
remain price competitive.
249
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farmers. The USDA and federal government then took advantage of the increased
demand stimulated by WWII and the Korean war and raised price floors, pumping
money into and revitalizing the rural economy, but making the ACP land retirement
program less of a preferential option for farmers. Once wartime demand subdued,
soil conservation once again became a practical way to limit supply and thereby
prevent overproduction and contribute to the prosperity of farmers, resulting in the
creation of the Soil Bank in the 60s. Starting in the 60s, farm policy then shifted
some of its focus away from price floors and government non-recourse loans, and
aimed to supplement farmer’s income by stimulating demand. This led, in part, to
political momentum for the Food for Peace program, food stamps and school lunch
programs, which increased the demand for agricultural commodities, and raised
prices. Global demand then skyrocketed for US agricultural commodities with the
onset of the recession in the 70s, because the weak dollar made for relatively more
price competitive US exports. But eventually the dollar recovered and US exports
shrank. Reacting to the threat of falling export demand, the 1985 farm bill protected
the US export market by using controversial export subsidies and international
marketing programs. In part, it was for the sake of farmers’ prosperity that the ‘85
farm bill strengthened the role of soil conservation, because restricting aggregate
production was economical in the context of falling prices. But contrary to this last
point and the pre-existing paradigm of conservation policy being used as a means
for strategic scarcity and farmer’s prosperity, the conservation compliance of the
1985 bill was a major shift.
The conservation compliance attempt of the ‘85 farm bill represented a more
assertive conservation policy that would no longer simply serve the short run
economic interests of farmers and for the first time would force farmers to comply
to conservation standards in order to be eligible for farm support. Ultimately,
conservation compliance failed for some of the same reasons that the ideal localized
committees of Dr. Gray failed; policing one’s peers and neighbors proved much
more problematic in practice than in theory. The ’85 conservation compliance policy
mandated that farmers establish a ‘conservation plan’ on ‘highly erodible land,’
intentionally vague so that what qualifies as a sufficient ‘conservation plan was left
111

to the discretion of local SCS (NRCS after 1994) agencies. But when failing to comply
resulted in farmers totally losing their farm support package, SCS agents were
reluctant to put their neighbors under the threat of bankruptcy, especially when
they had the option of not punishing farmers, since there were no specific guidelines
of what compliance entailed. The 1996 farm bill was the next major legislation in
agricultural policy and it removed the threat of losing eligibility for the rest of farm
support from the conservation compliance measure.
Conservation policies exist today that prevent farmers from tilling native sod,
provide payments for land retirement, and even some that provide the technical
assistance and payment incentives for implementing conservation practices on
private land, though the latter kind of programs are, in general, insufficiently
funded. But these policies are fragmented in their different ends and fail to address
the underlying issue of unaccounted for externalities. And because the existing
conservation policies do not address the fundamental problem of unaccounted for
externalities head on, current policy fails to incentivize the widespread adoption of
simple conservation practices in the way that a soil erosion tax would. Even though
conservation policy has remained a staple of the farm bill throughout its entire
history, it has been politically achievable primarily because of its role as
orchestrating scarcity for the sake of raising prices in a manner that is advantageous
for farmers. US agricultural policy has always been tool for securing the economic
prosperity of farmer.
A soil erosion tax is a kind of Pigouvian tax, which is a preferred policy
strategy for many economists and a relatively mainstream one. Simplified, the
Pigouvian strategy is to tax social ‘bads’ that are not felt upon the person who acts in
the way that leads to the specific cost, and to subsidies social ‘goods’ in the same
way. Pigouvian taxes are a traditional approach of modern welfare economic theory.
A common criticism against the use of a Pigouvian tax for agricultural policy is that
in order to estimate the appropriate social cost, one would need omniscient
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knowledge about a seemingly innumerable number of assumptions and
estimations.250
But like the writers of the Economist point out251, the fact that it is difficult
and perhaps impossible to find the perfectly accurate social cost that would lead to a
tax with the greatest social efficiency does not justify abandoning the project
altogether. By lowballing the estimated social cost, policy makers can improve the
status quo while offering a strong argument for its implementation; it’s the least that
we can afford to tax. Additionally, there already exists a host of research and
publications on models for estimating the social costs of agricultural externalities
that could be used as a starting point for policy makers, and continually improved
upon through further government research.
Just as the Economist’s defense of a carbon tax is analogous to a defense of a
soil erosion tax, the entire phenomenon of climate change is analogous to soil
erosion, along with the policy approaches to each. Both policies aim to address the
impending market failures that result from discounting the far distant future costs
of production. The Nordhaus vs. Stern debate brings to focus the contentious role
that discounting plays in the way we consider ecological costs and I find that
ultimately Sterns argument for a low discount rate is far more convincing. But
because elsewhere in this essay I have maintained that a successful agricultural
policy needs to be pragmatic one,252 policy makers should recognize the criticisms
of Nordhaus and utilize moderate discount rates in their soil erosion tax estimation
so that the policy garners more widespread political support.
The most important political support to garner for agricultural policy reform
and the shift to a soil erosion tax (or other Pigouvian tax applied to agriculture) is
that of farmers and the agribusiness lobby. Although it seems counterintuitive for
On a basic level for a soil erosion tax, this would entail knowing quantity of soil lost on each unit of
cultivated land, and the associated economic cost. Estimating each of with accuracy is indeed
problematic without omniscience. What crops will be planted in the future? How will seed
technology improve yields over time.
251 The article in the Economist addresses the carbon tax issue, but is analogous to other Pigouvian
taxes, like a hypothetical soil erosion tax.
252 For example the move in Part A conclusions that the economic liberty and total autonomy of
farmers on their private land should be accepted as a political given and worked around rather than
pushed against.
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farmers and agribusinesses to support being taxed, the individuals involved in this
industry should view a soil erosion tax as an opportunity to achieve their
environmental goals while remaining financially solvent. It is difficult and perhaps
impossible for individual farmers and food processors to make the ecological
considerations they would like while also remaining price competitive. However, a
soil erosion tax would keep everyone in the US on an even playing field while
making ecological consideration a part of what it means to be price competitive.
Also, in the face of mounting political support for radical environmental change, a
soil erosion tax that preserves the autonomy and economic liberty of farmers is a
relatively moderate means for achieving sustainable agriculture
Implementing a soil erosion tax would shift the economy in certain ways.
Taxes increase the costs of production and would make US farmers less price
competitive on the global market. From a global justice perspective, this would
probably be beneficial, increasing prices for farmers in developing countries with
agrarian economies. The increased costs of production might potentially be
problematic for the financial solvency of farmers, but this effect could be counter
balanced relatively easily by continuing to provide the government farm safety net.
The simultaneous government policies of a soil erosion tax and a safety net might
confuse someone to ask, why would farmers be incentivized to implement
conservation practices if the are going to be protected from bankruptcy by the
government, regardless of how they farm? The answer to this objection is that
farmers are profit seeking on the margins; a ‘rational’ farmer will still seek to avoid
additional costs that result from a soil erosion tax in order to maximize profits,
regardless of whether or not they are protected from total bankruptcy. The
increased price of production would also increase the price of food and agricultural
commodities in the US. This would be problematic for low-income families in the
short run, but eventually markets would adjust to a new equilibrium where the
wages of workers adjusts to the inflated price of basic goods. Or perhaps the
revenue from the soil erosion tax could be used to provide cheaper food to low
income households.

114

The historical policy approaches to incentivizing conservation agriculture
have been mostly unsuccessful. The strict oversight through local committees was
never really established in the late 1930s. Land retirement programs have usually
only played a role insofar as they contributed to the short run prosperity of farmers,
being utilized during times of low prices when planned scarcity was advantageous
to farmers. And the conservation compliance of the ’85 farm bill was extremely
unpopular amongst farmers and was politically unpragmatic. History warrants a
new approach, and a soil erosion tax is the best candidate for the job.
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